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ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy Prediction: A Model for the Casino Industry
by
David W. Patterson, CPA
Dr. Bernard Fried, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f Hospitality Finance and Accounting 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This study shows the development o f a discriminant model to predict failure or 
non-failure in the casino industry. The objective o f the study is to provide a model 
developed for the casino industry using financial data from a sample o f failed and non­
failed casinos. The data was provided by the Nevada Gaming Control Board from 
information they collect from all licensed casinos w ith over $ l m illion in annual revenue.
The theoretical model developed for the study includes five constructs that 
indicate success or failure in the casino business. The five constructs are: Management, 
Location, Ambiance, Marketing and Financial Strength. Due to limitations in the data, 
two o f these constructs were not included in the development o f the discriminant model; 
Location and Ambiance.
The model includes twelve predictor variables: A&P/Total Revenues, Cash 
Flow/Liabilities, Net Income/Assets, Sales/Assets, Operating Margin, Payroll/Revenues,
lU
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Payroll/Assets, % Change in A&P/Total Revenues, % Change in Cash/Liabilities, % 
Change in Sales/Assets, % Change in Operating Margin, % Change in Payroll/Revenue 
and % Change in Payroll/Assets.
The model accurately predicted group membership for 100% o f the cases 
included in the study. The model was shown to be statistically valid using a W ilks’ 
Lambda test. The model was also tested using data that were not included in the 
development o f the model. The classification accuracy o f this data set was 100% for 
failed firms and 89% for the non-failed firms, w ith an overall classification accuracy o f 
92.3%.
The model predicted failure more accurately than three traditional models using 
casino data had done in a previous study. The three models were the Altman Z score 
model, which had a prediction accuracy rate o f 50% one year prior to failure, the Deakin 
model, which had a prediction accuracy rate o f 29% one year prior to failure and the 
Zavgren model, which had an accuracy prediction rate o f 21% one year prior to failure.
The study shows that a financial analysis model that is developed specifically for 
the casino industry provides much more accurate information to its users.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, in 1976, the only legal casinos in the United States were 
located in the state o f Nevada. These casinos were financed primarily by individual 
investors (there were some limited exceptions, such as loans from the Teamster’s pension 
fund, controlled by Jimmy Hoffa, and loans from Perry Thomas’ Valley Bank). The 
casino industry has grown fix)m a market value o f a few hundred m illion dollars in those 
days, to several billions o f dollars during the last several years. Much o f this growth has 
been accomplished through public stock offerings, public debt offerings and an 
increasingly large amount o f bank debt. Not only has there been an increase in the 
magnitude o f the investment in the casino industry, the number o f individuals directly 
and indirectly investing has also increased significantly. With this increased investment 
and increased investor base has come a more complex vulnerability to potential losses 
caused by business failure.
Despite many success stories in the casino industry, there have also been casinos 
that have failed, causing their investors and their creditors to suffer significant losses. 
Not all casino failures are singularly because o f financial reasons either, other factors 
such as location and marketing strategy can be just as important. I f  there were a means o f 
predicting the combination o f characteristics o f casinos that are likely to fail, corrective
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measures could be taken to alter their underlying problems, redefine strategies and 
procedures or in some instances avoid or reduce investments in questionable firms that 
cannot be salvaged.
One method used in evaluating the likelihood o f success or failure o f a business is 
to examine its financial ratios. Since failure o f a company, as defined by bankruptcy, is 
the inability o f the company to be able to meet its credit obligations as they become due, 
there is by definition a relationship between the company’s financial position and its 
status as a failed or non-failed company. But, the purpose o f bankruptcy prediction is to 
be able to identify characteristics that are likely to lead to bankruptcy, not to define a 
bankrupt firm. One method o f predicting business success or failure that has been widely 
used over the past thirty years is the statistical bankruptcy prediction model, first 
presented by Edward I. Altman in his 1967 Ph.D. dissertation (Altman, 1988).
Why use bankruptcy prediction models? Bankruptcy prediction models present 
their users with the opportunity to assess the quality o f a business’s financial performance 
and position relative to other businesses through the use o f a single index figure, whose 
value indicates success or failure (Altman, 1968; Aziz, Emanuel &  Lawson, 1988; Aziz 
&  Lawson, 1989; Blum, 1974; Bukovinsky, 1993; Deakin, 1977; McGurr, 1966; Ohlson, 
1980). But, while traditional bankruptcy prediction models have been shown to work 
well for predicting the classification o f specific types o f businesses into failed and non- 
failed groups (Altman, 1988), none were developed for use specifically in the casino 
industry.
The rationale for the need to have a bankruptcy prediction model that is based on 
the industry being examined is that different factors could be more significant in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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predicting the success or failure o f a business in a particular industry because o f the way 
that industry works. Edward Altman developed what is generally considered the first 
modem bankruptcy analysis (Platt, 1985). This original bankruptcy prediction model 
relied on information that was available from public records about industrial 
(manufacturing) companies (Altman, 1967). Fifteen years after publishing his initial 
model, Altman authored a book (1983) recapping the evolution o f bankruptcy prediction 
efforts. In this book Altman points to the need for industry specific studies:
We realize that the relative heterogeneity o f industrial firms, both manufacturers 
and retailers constrains the model as to its expected accuracy for firms whose 
affiliation differs from that o f the “ average”  industrial company...The ideal would 
be to construct individual models for specific industries (p. 273).
There have been some studies on other industries such as a study o f failures in the 
Savings and Loan business done by Pantalone &  Platt in 1985. Edminister (1971) 
studied small firms with defaulted SBA loans. Altman also did a study o f railroads 
(Altman, 1983). There are no published studies o f casinos.
The casino industry is a service industry, but at the same time can involve a large 
capital investment. Operationally, casinos are highly labor intensive, there is only a small 
part o f the casino revenue generating process that involves the conversion o f a raw 
material into a sales product. Unlike a manufacturing or retail business, casinos do not 
convert an inventory into a product. The venue o f a casino, like a retail business, is 
highly visible and important to the customers’ patronage. Significant portions o f a 
casino’s fixed assets have relatively short lives (compared to the buildings and equipment 
in a typical manufacturing business).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Problem Statement
Bankruptcy prediction models present their users w ith the opportunity to assess 
the financial health o f an organization, i f  they work properly. An earlier study (Patterson, 
1999) tested three traditional bankruptcy prediction models (Altman, 1967; Deakin, 1972; 
Zavgren, 1985), using financial data from failed and non-failed casinos. None o f these 
three models predicted failure and non-failure with better results than would be expected 
using a priori probabilities. The objective o f this study is to develop a statistical model 
that w ill differentiate between casinos that are likely to fail and those that are not likely 
to-fail with a higher classification rate than existing bankruptcy prediction models.
Limitations
A limitation o f this study is the availability o f financial information on individual 
casinos. The relatively small number o f casinos that have filed bankruptcy further limits 
the scope o f the study, and the availability o f sufficient data for tests o f statistical 
reliability.
There are alternative statistical methods that have been employed in bankruptcy 
prediction studies. The only statistical methodology used in this study was discriminant 
analysis.
The Nevada Gaming Control Board supplied the financial ratio information used 
in this study. Due to Nevada state law, the Board is not allowed to release any financial 
information that could be identified as coming fix>m a specific casino. One o f the 
limitations related to this restriction was that additional information concerning the data 
was not readily available, subsequent to the initial request for the data. In addition, since
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the providing o f the data was unprecedented, additional requests were determined to be 
inappropriate to future relations with the Gaming Control Board. The result o f this 
limitation was that some o f the data supplied could not be used in the study.
Delimitation
Two o f the problems facing any analysis that requires financial operating data are 
consistency and availability. The casino industry has a history o f being particularly 
secretive about its financial data, and there are no uniform standards that are generally 
applied to the manner in which casinos keep their records. An exception to this 
generality is the information that casinos in Nevada with gross revenue o f $1 m illion or 
more are required to submit to the Nevada Gaming Control Board on an annual basis 
(NGCR 6.070).
Similar information has been collected and compiled by the Gaming Control 
Board for each o f the past fifteen years. While the information needed for the study is 
available from these reports, Nevada state law prohibits the Gaming Control Board firom 
divulging financial information about the casinos, except in the aggregate. In order to 
obtain permission to obtain the necessary information to complete this study, it was 
necessary to establish the significance o f the study and to provide a format that would 
conceal the identity o f the properties. By restricting the information requests to ratios 
rather than absolute numbers and by not asking for the dates o f the information, the 
possibility o f identifying the properties through a process o f elimination was virtually 
eliminated. An additional requirement for obtaining the information was that in order to
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maintain the confidentiality o f the process, the actual gathering o f the raw data would 
have to be performed by staff o f the Gaming Board’s audit division.
Once the Gaming Board had agreed to provide the data needed for the study, 
additional meetings were held with audit division personnel to discuss specifics o f the 
data requirements. The firms to be studied would be limited to those Nevada firms that 
had been in bankruptcy proceedings during the past fifteen years (failed casinos). The 
financial information was to be from each o f the two years prior to the date o f the 
individual casino’s bankruptcy filing.
The Gaming Board also agreed to supply similar financial ratios for firms that had 
not been involved in bankruptcy proceedings (non-failed casinos). The non-failed 
casinos chosen were casinos o f similar size (as determined by casino square footage) and 
the financial information was to be from the same years as that for the failed casinos o f a 
similar size. The non-failed casinos were also to be chosen from the same type o f market 
area and geographic location.
Several kinds o f statistical analysis have been used in bankruptcy prediction 
models, including; univariate analysis (Beaver, 1966), multiple discriminant analysis 
(Altman, 1967; Deakin, 1972), linear probability models (Myer &  Pifer, 1970), logit 
analysis (Ohlson, 1980; Zavgren, 1985; Gentry, Newbold &  Whitford, 1985), probit 
analysis (Grablowsky &  Talley, 1981) and neural network analysis (Tam, 1991; Tam & 
Kiang, 1992). Only one o f these methods w ill be utilized in this study: multiple 
discriminant analysis. Despite some limitations, this is the method that has been used in 
more studies than any other method and it is the method that has consistently produced 
the most accurate prediction/classification accuracy.
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Definitions
A  priori probabilities. Probabilities that are based on prior knowledge about the sample. 
In an analysis where there are two equal sized groups o f cases, the a priori probability o f 
choosing the correct group for a case chosen at random would be 50%.
Business Failure. The inability o f a firm to meet its obligations when due. For purposes 
o f this study, the filing o f bankruptcy proceedings (either voluntary or involuntary) 
indicates business failure.
Capital Replacements. The amount spent to upgrade or replace the capital assets o f a 
firm. For purposes o f this study, capital replacements were determined by taking the 
difference between beginning and ending property and equipment, not including 
construction-in-progress and not including any deductions for accumulated depreciation. 
Cash Flow fi-om Operations. The amount o f cash received firom operating activities. For 
purposes o f this study cash flow firom operations is calculated by adding net income plus 
depreciation plus decreases in current assets plus increases in current liabilities.
Casino Industry. The population o f all casino companies that offer casino games, 
including table games and slot machines, includes casinos in all jurisdictions. This study 
only includes casinos doing business in the state o f Nevada. Since the financial 
characteristics o f these casinos may or may not be similar to casinos in other 
jurisdictions, the results may or may not be valid for the casinos in other jurisdictions. 
Classification Accuracy. The percentage o f cases that are classified into the correct 
group through a prediction model.
Collinearitv. Exists when there is a statistical relationship between two variables.
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Current Assets. Cash plus marketable securities plus receivables plus inventories plus 
prepaid expenses.
Current Liabilities. Accounts Payable plus Accrued Expenses plus Deposits plus the 
Current Portion o f Long Term Debt.
Failed Firm. A firm that has been a subject o f bankruptcy proceedings, either voluntary 
or involuntary.
Gaming Revenues. The amount o f money wagered by customers less the amounts paid 
out to customers for winnings. Also called “ Win” .
Marketing Costs. For purposes o f this study, the amounts spent for advertising and 
promotion.
Multi-collinearity. Problem that occurs in a correlation matrix when variables are too 
highly correlated. Can occur when there are two or more variables that measure the same 
thing.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis. A statistical analysis technique for distinguishing 
among defined groups by developing a linear combination o f discriminating independent 
variables. Inputs are variables that discriminate between the groups. The analysis 
defines each group as a vector o f attributes that constitute a density function. The process 
maps the multi-dimensional characteristics o f the density function o f the population’s 
attributes onto a one-dimensional measure by forming a linear combination o f the 
attribute along some axis. The purpose o f the analysis is to derive relationships that 
minimize the variances within a group while maximizing the variances between groups. 
Naïve determination. The likelihood o f predicting a particular outcome based on the a 
priori probabilities o f the data being examined.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Non-failed firms. Firms that have not the subject o f a bankruptcy proceeding.
Operating Income. Revenues less operating expenses.
Operating Margin. Operating Income divided by Revenues.
Ouick Assets. Cash plus marketable securities plus receivables.
Total Revenues. The amounts received by the operation from customers for purchases o f 
goods and services plus Gaming Revenues.
Type One Errors. Classifying a failing firm as non-failing. These are generally 
considered the more serious errors for investors or lenders, as investments could be made 
which otherwise might not have been made.
Type Two Errors. Classifying a non-failing firm as failing.
Univariate Analysis. The technique o f looking at only one variable at a time to explain a 
result. Assumes im plicitly that all other variables are equal. This is the method used by 
Beaver to analyze financial ratios and develop values that indicated the ratio level to be 
expected in a failed or a non-failed firm.
Working Capital. Current Assets less Current Liabilities.
Tests o f Results
To test the classification accuracy o f the model developed for the study, the model 
w ill be tested using data from casinos that are not used in the development o f the 
differentiation model. The results o f the tests w ill be compared to results from the three 
models tested in a prior study (Patterson, 1998) and to the a priori probabilities o f failure 
and non-failure based on the mix o f casinos used in the test (an equal number o f failed 
and non-failed casinos would result in a 50% likelihood o f proper classification by
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predicting either failure or non-failure for the entire group). The Null Hypotheses and the 
Alternative Hypotheses to be tested are as follows:
Hnuii i: A  statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data w ill 
not predict bankruptcy more accurately than a naïve prediction.
HAitemative i: A Statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data 
w ill predict bankruptcy more accurately than a naïve prediction.
Hnuii 2- A statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data w ill 
not predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Altman Z Score model (1967). 
HAitemative 2- A Statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data 
w ill predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Altman Z Score model ( 1967). 
Hnuii 3: A statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data w ill 
not predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Deakin model (1972).
HAitemative i- A Statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data 
w ill predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Deakin model (1972).
Hnuu 4 : A statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data w ill 
not predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Zavgren model (1985).
HAitemative 4 : A Statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed using casino data 
w ill predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Zavgren model (1985).
Organization o f Paper 
Chapter 2 traces the history o f financial statement analysis and bankruptcy 
prediction studies. It also reviews a recent study o f the effectiveness o f traditional 
bankruptcy prediction methods for predicting bankruptcy in the casino business.
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Chapter 3 describes the data that were collected for use in the analysis and the 
methods that were used to construct the predictive model.
Chapter 4 presents the model that was developed to predict failure or non-failure 
and the results o f the predictions. Tests o f casinos not included in the development o f the 
model are used to validate the model.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results o f the tests and conclusions about the 
applicability o f the test results to the casino industry. Opportunities for additional 
research and future studies are also presented.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The process o f understanding and being able to interpret the meaning o f financial 
statements has been an evolutionary process. Before the type o f analysis that is being 
used for statistical bankruptcy prediction was possible, reliable and consistent financial 
statements had to be available. The fundamental financial ratios that are used in for 
statistical bankruptcy prediction analysis had to be developed, and the relevancy o f those 
ratios had to be established. This literature review section w ill trace the history o f 
accounting in the United States, financial ratio analysis and classic bankruptcy prediction 
models.
Accoimting in the United States
In order to have meaningful financial analysis, one must first have good 
accounting records. The keeping o f accounting records in the United States is as old as 
its discovery by Columbus. On his famous 1492 voyage, one o f his crew o f forty men 
was the royal controller o f accounts. This controller was sent to keep track o f Columbus 
and to keep records o f the gold and spices Columbus was expected to discover during his 
voyage (Cooke, 1973).
12
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Even the pilgrims had accountants, although there were apparently some 
problems with the way one o f their first kept the accounting records. According to 
Willard Stone (1979), as early as 1620 they were concerned about their finances and that 
their treasurer, Mr. Martin, had not fulfilled his responsibilities. Less than a year later, 
they were asked by their London financier-merchant, Thomas Weston to, “ Give us 
accounts as (sic) perticulerly as you can how our moneys were laid out."
Although there were accountants practicing in the United States throughout the 
1700s and 1800s, it was not until the late 1800s that public accounting became an 
organized and regulated profession that would begin to wield some influence in the 
business world. During the last half o f the 19'** century, business in the United States was 
dominated by giant trusts in railroads, oil, steel, banking, tobacco, sugar and coal. But by 
the end o f the century, the autonomy o f these companies was being eroded by events such 
as the passage o f the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, a European money market panic in 
1873 that had resulted in the failure o f more than 5,000 companies and losses o f $220 
m illion (Eels, 1951) and the panic o f 1893, which initiated one o f the most severe 
depressions in United States history (Previts &  Merino, 1979).
It was in this climate that the role o f the public accountant and the practice o f 
financial analysis began to emerge. According to Previts and Merino (1979), three o f the 
earliest advocates o f financial analysis were Thomas F. Woodlock, John Moody and 
Henry Clews. Clews was a well known financial author who felt that public accountants 
would provide publicity to corporate financial records. Woodlock published a book in 
1895, The Anatomy o f a Railroad Report, that was considered the authoritative resource 
for understanding railroad reports. Moody also wrote about railroad company financials
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in his book. How to Analyze Railroad Reports. It was also during this period that the 
first organized accounting professionals organizations were begun in the United States.
The first organized professional association o f accountants. The Institute o f 
Accountants and Bookkeepers, was formed in New York on July 28, 1882. The 
association was later renamed the Institute o f Accounts. The purpose o f the organization 
was to try to lend an image o f professionalism to what was viewed by some as a less than 
honorable endeavor. According to Previts and Merino (1979), James T. Anyon, an early 
CPA, suggested that, the “back parlor”  (moonlighting) nature o f many American 
accounting practices raised doubts among the public about the quality, ability and 
character o f early native accountants. He noted that accountants were viewed as “ men o f 
figures”  -  those who dealt in and loved figures for themselves, who calculated balances 
in accounts, prepared elaborate statements and looked for errors. Accountants were 
viewed as the type o f persons who thought figures, sometimes juggled them, and always 
wrote and talked them.”  Previts and Merino (1979) cite another early accountant’s view 
o f accounting, which seems to be more o f the image the profession wanted to establish 
with the public:
The professional accountant is an investigator, a looker for leaks, a dissector and a 
detective in the highest acceptation o f the term; he must have a good knowledge 
o f real estate, machinery, buildings and other property. His business is to verify 
that which is right and to detect and expose that which is wrong; to discover and 
report facts as they exist, whether they be plainly expressed by clear and distinct 
records or whether they be concealed by the cunning naive or hidden under 
plausibly arranged figures or as is fi-equently the case omitted fi’om the records
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
entirely. He is a reader o f hieroglyphics, however written, for every erasure, 
altercation, (sic) interlining, dot, dash or character may have a meaning. He must 
interpret, rearrange and produce in simple but distinct from self explanatory and 
free from mysteries o f bookkeeping, the narrative o f facts, the relation o f each 
other in results. He is the foe o f deceit and the champion o f honesty (Keister 
1896). (p. 90)
The second accountants’ society to be formed was the American Association o f 
Public Accoimtants, on September 20, 1887. This group would later become the 
American Institute o f Certified Public Accoimtants (AICPA). While the Institute o f 
Accounts had a entrance exams that tested practical and technical competence as early as 
1884, it was not until 1897 that the first public accounting law was passed by the New 
York legislature, through the combined efforts o f the two organizations.
With the emergence o f the professional accountant, creditors and investors were 
in a position at the beginning o f the twentieth century to start being more comfortable 
relying on the financial statements o f companies when making credit and investment 
decisions. Before this time, most credit decisions were based on the creditor’s personal 
knowledge o f the debtor’s ability to pay (Brown, 1955). According to Brown, the use o f 
financial statements for granting credit was only beginning to be accepted prior to 1900. 
She attributes one o f the earUest written documentations o f credit analysis to Peter R. 
Earling, who wrote a paper entitled. Whom to Trust: A  Practical Treatise on Mercantile 
Credits. His recommendations included an examination o f asset valuation, the 
relationships between assets, liabilities and net worth.
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Brown’s dissertation also describes the contributions o f James Graham Cannon, 
who presented a paper in 1905 to the New Jersey Bankers Association. Cannon 
maintained that the most important feature o f credit science was the interpretation o f the 
borrower’s statement (balance sheet). According to Cannon, an unanalyzed statement 
was worse than no statement. His rules for credit were fairly simple, only quick assets 
should be considered in making a loan, and total credit should not exceed fifty  percent o f 
the quick assets. Cannon also presented an analysis o f a set o f “ typical balance sheets” , 
for four groups o f borrowers. In this analysis Cannon calculated quick assets, fixed 
assets, liabilities and net worth, each as a percentage o f total assets. He also computed 
sales per dollars o f quick assets and total assets. He then compared the percentages for 
the different groups. According to Brown, this analysis “opened a wide field for use o f 
percentages and proportion in the analysis o f financial statements”  (Brown, 1955, p. 12).
Cannon’s use o f percentages in the analysis o f financial statements was not 
widely used during this early period, but it did foreshadow a way o f looking at companies 
o f various sizes and types o f businesses in a different manner. This was one o f the first 
examples o f financial ratio analysis.
Financial Ratio Analysis 
Financial ratios were the first analytical method o f assessing the financial 
performance o f a company. Financial ratios were also one o f the first tools for predicting 
the future performance o f a company.
James Horrigan introduces his anthology o f articles on financial ratio analysis 
with the following observation:
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In a fundamental sense, the development o f financial ratios was probably 
inevitable. Accounting statements themselves report absolute numbers and those 
numbers only convey infonnation about the size o f the firm. Big firms have big 
numbers and small firms have small numbers. Some kind o f relative numbers had 
to be developed i f  analysts were to make any sense out o f accounting data. 
Therefore, financial ratios really represented the first attempt to measure various 
underlying relationships that would reveal the true essence o f firms, (p. 1 ). 
Woodlock’s The Anatomy o f a Railroad Report (1900) discussed such financial 
measures as “ the percentage o f operating expenses to gross earnings” , “ the ratio o f fixed 
charges to net income”  and “ the relative proportion which the funded debt and stock o f a 
company should bear to the actual cost o f the property” . In regard to current position, 
Woodlock said, “ In general, current items on each side o f the account should at least 
fairly offset each other, year by year.”  In his 1911 The Principles o f Bond Investment, 
Lawrence Chamberlain used Woodlock’s ratio o f operating expenses to gross earnings, 
calling it the “operating ratio”  (Myer, 1939, p. 6-7).
The need for a measurable method o f making credit and investment decisions was 
the primary reason for the initial development o f financial ratio analysis. “ Analysis o f 
financial ratios began in the early 1900’s with the development o f the current ratio and 
the creation o f a benchmark level for an acceptable relationship”  (Beaver, 1966, p. 71). 
“ Other ratios were developed in the 1890’s, but this ratio, the current ratio, was to have a 
more significant and long lasting impact upon financial statement analysis than any other 
ratio”  (Horrigan, 1968).
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A classic report issued in 1919 to the Federal Reserve Bank, “ Study o f Credit 
Barometrics” , by an employee o f the National Bank o f Commerce, a Detroit bank, 
Alexander Wall, used seven different financial ratios from nearly a thousand firms to 
establish a norm for analysis. Wall had collected this information over a seven year 
period from financial statements he obtained from the files o f commercial paper brokers 
(Horrigan, 1968). In the article Wall criticized bankers who based their decisions on the 
amount o f the current ratio alone. He gave hypothetical examples showing the volatility 
o f the current ratio and its components, and discussed factors that could explain 
differences in current ratios between different companies. He maintained that to get a 
complete picture o f the financial condition o f a firm other relationships should be used as 
a check on the current ratio (Wall, 1919). According to Horrigan (1968), “ Wall had, in 
effect, popularized the ideas o f using many ratios and using empirically determined 
relative ratio criteria”  (p. 286).
The twenty years following W all’s original presentation was a period o f 
increasing interest in the financial world on the subject o f ratios. There were several 
compilations o f financial ratio data averages, the process at the time being described as, 
“ scientific ratio analysis”  (Justin, 1924). There were many new ratios developed during 
this period, and in an attempt to control the proliferation. Wall developed an index for 
many o f these by weighting the ratios according to a relative value he assigned to each 
ratio Horrigan (1968). Another analyst who made significant contributions during this 
period was James Bliss who presented a set o f principles for the use o f ratios in 
management. He maintained that there were more or less normal relations that must exist 
within a business i f  it  was to be profitable (Brown, 1955).
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While many new ratios were developed in the 1920’s and many financial scholars 
and practitioners were enthusiastic about the potential o f using these new methods, there 
were others who disagreed. One such critic was Stephen Gilman, who did not feel that 
ratios portrayed the fimdamental relationships within a business. He listed four reasons 
for not using ratios to analyze companies in his book Analyzing Financial Statements. 
The objections were: 1. Their changes over time cannot be interpreted because the 
numerator and the denominator o f the ratio both vary, 2. The ratios are “ artificial”  
measures, 3. They divert the analyst’s attention firom a comprehensive view o f the firm, 
4. Their reliability as indicators varies widely between ratios (Horrigan, 1968).
Studies conducted in the 1930’s found that failing firms had significantly different 
financial ratios than those o f non-failing firms (Altman, 1988). Arthur Winakor and 
Raymond Smith published a study for the University o f Illinois, Bureau o f Business 
Research in 1930, Bulletin No. 31, A Test Analysis o f Unsuccessful Industrial 
Companies, which analyzed the financial statements o f 29 companies in an attempt to 
discover characteristics that would assist in anticipating probable failure. Their second 
study. Changes in the Financial Structure o f Unsuccessful Industrial Corporations, 
expanded the original study to 183 companies. They found that the most accurate and 
consistent indicator o f failure was the ratio o f working capital to total assets. Their study 
also showed significant differences in the ratios o f companies fi*om different industries 
and differences depending on the amount o f time between the dates o f the financial 
information and the dates o f failure, some ratios improved and others got worse with the 
proximity o f the failure date (Smith &  Winakor, 1935).
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Paul FitzPatrick in his 1931 study. Symptoms o f Industrial Failure, studied trends 
in thirteen ratios over a period o f three years for twenty failed and nineteen non-failed 
companies. FitzPatrick discussed each o f the ratios and the conventional thinking about 
the minimum acceptable level o f each. The minimum level for the current ratio was 
2 0 0 %, the quick (or acid-test) ratio was 1 0 0 %, net worth to total liabilities was 1 0 0 %. 
The other ratios were all, to some extent dependent upon the type o f company. 
FitzPatrick also looked at the trend o f the ratios over time; did they improve or did they 
decline. He found that levels o f the majority o f the ratios were “ satisfactory”  for the 
majority o f the successful companies and that the unsuccessful companies all had a 
niunber o f unsatisfactory ratio levels. He also found that the successful companies had 
better ratios than the unsuccessful ones. Finally, he noted the increasing importance o f 
the net worth to debt and net profit to net worth ratios, and the decreasing importance o f 
the current ratio and the quick ratio in predicting business failure. His final comment was 
on the unavailability o f data on failed companies (FitzPatrick, 1931).
In 1942, Charles Merwin published a study. Financing Small Corporations: In 
Five Manufacturing Industries, 1926-36. He analyzed trends in ratios over a six-year 
period for “ continuing and discontinuing”  firms, comparing mean ratios for the 
discontinued firms against the average ratio values for the continuing firms. His 
conclusion was that three ratios accurately predicted failure, net working capital to total 
assets, net worth to debt and the current ratio. According to Horrigan, “ Merwin’s study 
was the first really sophisticated analysis o f ratio predictive power”  (Horrigan, 1968, 
p.290). The next stage in the development o f financial analysis was the use o f statistical 
methodologies to predict the future o f companies. The most well known univariate study
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was done by W illiam  Beaver and the most well known multivariate study was done by 
Edward Altman. Each o f these studies w ill be reviewed next, as w ill some o f the other 
more well-known bankruptcy prediction studies.
William H. Beaver, 1966
W illiam H. Beaver did a classic study using univariate analysis to examine the 
ability o f financial ratios to predict business failure in 1966. According to Edward 
Altman, this study “ set the stage for the multivariate attempts, by this author and others, 
which followed”  (Altman, 1993, p. 181). Horrigan said, “This study w ill undoubtedly 
become a landmark for future analysis in ratio analysis.”  (Horrigan, 1968, p. 291).
Beaver first selected a set o f thirty existing financial ratios that he felt were the 
best measures o f a firm ’s health. He then grouped these ratios into six groups according 
to what they measured. The six groups were cash flow ratios, net income ratios, debt-to- 
total assets ratios, liquid assets to total assets ratios, liquid assets to current debt ratios 
and turnover ratios. The ratios studied are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Beaver’s List o f Ratios Tested
C asfrF Icw R a^
1. Cash flow to sales
2. Cash flow to total assets
3. Cash flow to net worth
4. Cash flow to total debt 
Net Income Ratios
1. Net income to sales
2. Net income to total assets
3. Net income to net worth
4. Net income to total debt 
Debt to Total Asset Ratios
1. Current liabilities to total assets
2. Long-term liabilities to total assets
3. Current + long-term liabilities to total assets
4. Current + long-term liabilities + preferred 
stock to total assets
Liquid Assets to Total AssetRatios
1. Cash to total assets
2. Quick assets to total assets
3. Current assets to total assets
4. Working capital to total assets
Lupn&Assetto Current Debt Ratios
1. Cash to current liabilities
2. Quick assets to current liabilities
3. Current ratio 
Turnover Ratios
1. Cash to sales
2. Accounts receivable to sales
3. Inventory to sales
4. Quick assets to sales
5. Current assets to sales
6 . Working capital to sales
7. Net worth to sales
8 . Total assets to sales
9. Cash to expenditures for 
operations
10. Defensive assets to expenditures 
for operations
11. Defensive assets minus current 
liabilities to expenditures for 
operations.
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These ratios were selected based on three criteria. First the ratio had to generally 
be considered, by the financial hterature, to be reflective o f the crucial relationships o f a 
firm ’s condition. He cautioned that the popularity o f a ratio did have a drawback, in that, 
“ the most popular ratios w ill become those most manipulated by management (an activity 
known as window dressing) in a marmer that destroys their u tility  ” (Beaver, 1966, pp. 79- 
80).
The second criterion was that the ratio had performed well in one o f the previous 
studies o f bankrupt companies. The third criterion was that the ratio be defined in terms 
o f a cash-flow concept. Beaver felt that “ cash-flow ratios offer much promise for 
providing ratio analysis with a unified fi'amework...”  (Beaver, 1966, p. 80). Satisfaction 
o f any o f the criteria was sufficient for inclusion in the study. In order to have each o f the 
ratios provide as much additional information as possible; Beaver excluded any ratio that 
was a “ transformation”  o f another ratio that had already been selected.
Beaver’s model was based on four propositions, all else being equal. First that the 
more net liquid assets a firm has, the smaller the probability o f failure. Second that the 
larger the net cash flow fi-om operations, the smaller the probability o f failure. Third that 
the larger the amount o f debt o f the company, the greater the probability o f failure. 
Finally that the larger the amoimt o f liquid assets required to fund operating expenditures, 
the greater the probability o f failure.
He used these propositions to test the predictive ability o f the ratios. Using a set 
o f 79 failed companies and a matched set o f 79 non-failed companies; he calculated each 
o f the thirty ratios. His results showed that, “ The difference in the mean values is in the 
predicted direction for each ratio in all o f the five years before failure. Failed firms not
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only have lower cash flow than non-failed firms but also a smaller reservoir o f liquid 
assets. Although the failed firms have less capacity to meet obligations, they tend to 
incur more debt than do the non-failed firms”  (Beaver, 1966, p. 80).
He found that the data was very consistent and that it suggested that there is a 
difference in the ratios o f failed firms and non-failed firms. This was consistent with 
earlier studies. Fitzpatrick had published a study o f nineteen pairs o f failed and non- 
failed firms in 1932, which indicated repeated differences in the ratios for at least three 
years prior to failure. Winakor and Smith in a 1935 study had found deterioration in the 
mean values o f failed firms for ten years prior to failure, with the rate o f deterioration 
increasing as failure approached. These were the same results observed by Charles L 
Merwin in his 1942 study, (Beaver, 1966, pp. 81-82).
Having demonstrated that there was a difference in the ratios, Beaver wanted to 
answer the question o f how large the difference was. To accomplish this he then 
determined the relative fi-equency distribution o f each ratio for each group, failed and 
non-failed. Using these distributions, he was able to identify the ratio value at which the 
likelihood o f the firm being classified in the appropriate company group (failed or non- 
failed) was high and the likelihood o f the firm being classified in the wrong company 
group was low, for each o f the ratios he tested.
The six ratios that had the lowest classification error rate were cash flow to total 
debt, net income to total assets, total debt to total assets, working capital to total assets, 
current ratio and the no-credit interval ratio. The best performing ratio was cash flow to 
total debt, which had a classification error o f 13% in the year prior to failure. The next 
best performing ratio was net income to total assets.
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Beaver concludes that the predictive ability o f certain financial ratios, particularly 
cash flow to total debt provide useful information in assessing the likelihood o f a firm 
failing. However, he acknowledges that further research using the combination o f several 
ratios or changes in ratios might provide better predictive information. (Beaver, 1966 & 
1968).
Edward I. Altman, 1968
The first study to look at the effect o f using a combination o f financial ratios to 
predict business failure was done by Edward I. Altman in 1968 (Altman, 1968). Altman 
used a statistical technique known as multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to analyze 
the ratios o f the groups o f failed and non-failed firms in his study. The Altman Z score 
model is the most widely quoted model for predicting business failure and it is generally 
considered the standard by which other models are measured.
Based on previous studies, Altman selected a set o f twenty-two ratios that he felt 
might be significant indicators o f failure. Using the financial statements o f 33 failed and 
33 non-failed companies, Altman used a step-wise multiple discriminant analysis 
program to establish which ratios would most contribute to a formula that could 
differentiate the failed and non-failed companies. The results o f his analysis yielded a 
formula that used five o f these ratios; Working Capital/Total Assets (X ,) Retained 
Eamings/Total Assets (Xz), Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets ( X 3 ) ,  Market 
Value o f Equity/Book Value o f Total Debt ( X 4 )  and Sales/Total Assets ( X 5 ) .  Altman’s 
formula is presented below in Model One.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
Model I
Altman Z-Score Multiple Discriminant Analysis Model 
Z = .012X, + .0 1 4 X 2 + .0 3 3 X 3 + .0 0 6 X4 + .9 9 9 X 5
Where X| = Working capital/Total assets 
X2 = Retained eamings/Total assets 
X 3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
X4 = Market value equity/Book value o f total debt 
X 5  = Sales/Total Assets 
Z = Overall Index 
(Altman, 1968, p. 594).
One purpose o f multiple discriminant analysis is to predict group membership 
using a set o f predictor variables. This is accomplished by determining the set o f 
coefficients which, when applied to the observed values o f the predictor variables creates 
a discriminant function whose solution (the Z-score) maximizes the differentiation 
between one group and another. The distributions o f the solutions to the discriminant 
function from each group w ill provide a range o f acceptable values at a given 
significance level for each group. Figtu’e One is a graphical example o f how these 
distributions might look. The graph shows the tails o f each distribution intruding fairly 
far into each other; this is for illustrative purposes so that it is easier to label the relevant 
points, in an actual discrimination the tails would create a much smaller gray area.




Group One Group Two
Group One Cutoff '
Gray Area
Group Two Cutoff
The cutoff points are determined by assigning an acceptable significance level to 
each distribution. In the graph above, the Group Two Cutoff represents a point on the 
Group One distribution where one would expect that a value less than that amoimt would, 
with a high level o f confidence, belong to the population o f Group One. The Group One 
Cutoff represents a point on the Group Two distribution where one would expect that a 
value more than that amount would, with a high level o f confidence, belong to the 
population o f Group Two. The Gray Area represents the overlap o f the two distributions, 
where a value could be from either o f the two group populations.
Although he did not identify them as such, the ratios in Altman’s model represent 
the constructs o f failure prediction. These constructs are liquidity, cumulative 
profitability, productivity, return on investment and competitiveness.
There are understandable rationales behind the predictive ability o f each o f the 
ratios. The working capital to total assets ratio measures the firm ’s liquid assets relative
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to its total capitalization. A  finn experiencing consistent operating losses w ill usually 
have a shrinking proportion o f current assets relative to its total assets.
The retained earnings to total assets ratio measures cumulative profitability. 
Since the retained earnings account is a cumulative account, younger firms w ill have had 
less time to build it up. This creates a bias against younger firms, which is consistent 
with the reality that the incidence o f failure is higher in a firm ’s early years.
The earnings before interest and taxes to total assets ratio is a measure o f the 
firm ’s productive use o f its assets. Insolvency occurs when a firm ’s liabilities exceed the 
value o f its assets. Since earning ability is in fact the true measure o f the value o f the 
firm ’s assets, this ratio provides a basis for assessing the earning ability.
The market value o f equity to book value o f total debt ratio shows the level that 
the firm ’s value can decline before its liabilities exceeds its assets. The fifth ratio, sales 
to total assets measures management’s ability to deal with competition.
Once the discriminant function had been determined, Altman plotted each firm ’s 
Z score in a matrix to show how the individual scores line up with respect to the actual 
status o f the firm  (failed or non-failed). This evaluation matrix is presented in Table 
Two.




Predicted Group Membership 
Actual Group Membership Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt
Bankrupt H M,
Non-Bankrupt Mz H
The H ’s stand for correct classifications (Hits) and the M 's stand for 
misclassifications (Misses). M, represents Type 1 errors and Mz represents Type 2 
errors. The sum o f the correct hits divided by the total number o f firms being classified 
gives the percent o f firms correctly classified. This percentage is similar to the 
coefficient o f determination (R‘ ) in regression analysis, which measures the percent o f 
the variation o f the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. (Altman, 
1968).
When the original sample o f failed and non-failed firms were tested using this 
formula, the overall classification error rate one year prior to failure was 5%. Secondary 
samples used to test the accuracy o f the model also validated the accuracy o f the model.
To make the model usable without having to replicate the study for each 
application, Altman further studied the results o f his initial tests and derived cut-off 
values that would provide a basis for classification. The cut-off values Altman 
established was that all firms with Z scores less than 1.81 were failed, all firms with Z 
scores greater than 2.99 were non-failed and Z scores greater than 1.80 but less than 3.00 
were in a “ zone o f ignorance”  or gray area.
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In his conclusions, Altman said, “ A  limitation o f the study is that the firms 
examined were all publicly held manufacturing corporations, for which comprehensive 
financial data were obtainable, including market price quotations. An area for future 
research, therefore, would be to extend the analysis to relatively smaller asset-sized firms 
and unincorporated entities where the incidence o f business failure is greater than with 
larger corporations”  (Altman, 1968, p. 609).
Edward B. Deakin, 1972 
Deakin’s study combined the research o f Beaver and Altman into a single model. 
His perception was that while Beaver’s method had a superior predictive ability, 
Altman’s approach was intuitively more appealing. Using the fourteen ratios from 
Beaver’s study that best predicted failure, Deakin used the same MDA approach that 
Altman had used to derive a linear function that weights and combines the ratios in order 
to maximize the difference between the failed and non-failed groups.
In replicating the Beaver study, Deakin used a smaller sample, 32 failed firms 
instead o f 79, and took the data from a different time period, 1964 to 1970 instead o f 
1954 to 1964. He also ranked the values o f the ratios and then selected a cut-off point for 
each ratio that would minimize the occurrence o f misclassification errors. He compared 
his results to Beaver’s and found that the results “would tend to confirm Beaver’s 
observations.”  (Deakin, 1972, p. 169).
Deakin also performed a Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient test to 
determine the correlation o f the predictive ability o f the ratios. This test showed “ a rather
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high correlation o f relative predictive ability o f the various ratios.”  (Deakin, 1972, p. 
169).
The correlation coefficient in the third year before failure, while still significant, 
was 20 to 30 points lower than the other years. Through an analysis o f the financial 
statement items that were used to calculate the ratios, Deakin concluded that the failed 
firms tended to expand r^ id ly  in the third or fourth years prior to failure. This expansion 
was financed by increased debt and preferred stock rather than firom funds provided by 
operations or additional common stock. Subsequently the firms were unable to generate 
sufficient increases in sales and net income to repay this bigger debt load, therefore 
causing them to lose assets.
Deakin’s analysis yielded a different relationship for each o f five years preceding 
failure. While some o f the ratios showed a low contribution to the function, he found that 
leaving out any o f the fourteen ratios increased the number o f classification errors 
significantly. Rather than establishing a cut-off score, as Altman had done, Deakin 
classified firms according to their score’s deviation fi-om the mean score for each group.
Despite an error rate o f less than 5% in the three years prior to failure, Deakin’s 
original model was criticized for having different models for each year (Altman, 1993). 
Expanding on a technique used by Robert Libby (1975) in his study o f the usefulness o f 
accounting ratio information, Deakin revised his model in 1977.
Using principal-components analysis, Libby had identified only five independent 
sources o f variation in the fourteen ratios used in Deakin’s original study: profitability, 
activity, liquidity, asset balance and cash position. He then determined through an 
analysis o f the rotated factor matrix which o f the original ratios best represented each o f
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the five financial dimensions. He then provided the reduced set o f five ratios and the 
entire set o f the fourteen Deakin ratios to a group o f loan officers to test how well they 
would classify the failed and non-failed firms using the two sets o f information. His test 
showed that the predictive ability with the reduced number o f ratios was only slightly 
reduced.
Deakin developed a new model based on the five ratios identified by Libby. The 
model was tested against his original sample, as well as an additional sample o f 31 firms 
that failed during 1970 and 1971 and another sample o f 47 firms that failed during the 
period 1972 to 1974. For the last sample, the model correctly predicted 39 o f the failures, 
misclassified one firm and identified seven companies as in need o f further investigation, 
two years prior to failure, (Deakin, 1977).
Classification into the failed group or the non-failed group was based on the 
relative distance o f its index fi-om the average o f the failing and non-failing groups. 
Deakin did not specify cutoff values or ranges o f non-determinability in his study. 
However, firom the information he did provide about his results it is possible to estimate 
cutoff values. Deakin provided the results o f the calculation o f the group mean for each 
ratio. Using these means to solve the linear and the quadratic equations it is possible to 
determine a solution for each equation for each group’s mean values. The values that 
result fi-om solving the linear equations are -1.381 for failed firms and +1.053 for non- 
failed firms. The values for the quadratic formula are -37.84 for failed firms and -54.24 
for non-failed firms. Using these values however does not provide a zone o f ignorance.
I f  a firm ’s score is closer to the failed group, it is classified as failed, i f  it is closer to the 
non-failed group it is classified as non-failed. In order to resolve any differences between
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the two tests, Deakin used the decision rule that when both o f the tests showed that the 
firm  was failing or non-failing, the firm  was so classified. I f  the two tests classified the 
firm  differently, the firm  fell into the “ investigate further”  category. Deakin’s business 
failure prediction formulas are shown in Model 2.
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Model 2
Deakin’s Multiple Discriminate Analysis Model
Linear Equation:
I = -1.369 + 13.855X, + O.O6 OX2 -  O.6 OIX3 + 0.396X4 + 0.194X;
Quadratic Equation:
1= 1.78- 8.242X, -  70.06Xi^ -  31.57X2 -  5.65X,X2 -  22.06X2" +
12.93X3 +  20.49X1X3 +  50.82X2X3 -  204.7X3- -  5.79X4 +
0 .6 8 X 1X4 -  2 .O6 X 2X4 -  1.0 X 3X4 -  .8 8 X4  ^- .4 2 X 5 - .5 7 X 1X 5 -  
1 .4 6 X 2X 5 + 2 .5 X 3X 5 -  .3 4 X4X 5 + .1 7 X 5^
Where I = Overall Index
X| = Net Income/Total Assets 
X 2 = Current Assets/Total Assets 
X 3 = Cash/Total Assets 
X4  = Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
Xs= Sales/Current Assets
(Deakin, 1977, p. 79).
Altman also produced a model using both the linear and quadratic approach. This 
new model uses seven ratios that are different from the five used in his first model. The 
seven ratios measure return on assets, stability o f earnings, debt-service, cumulative 
profitability, liquidity, capitalization and size. The new model yields what Altman terms 
a Zeta score that produces superior accuracy to the old model in classifying firms and has 
received generally high reviews in financial literature. However, the model cannot be
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independently utilized for testing, as Altman has not released the details o f the model. 
He has a firm that markets the use o f the model for testing firms, (Altman, 1993).
Marc Blum and Robert Edmister conducted two other studies that are often 
included in financial literature concerning business failure prediction. Blum's 1974 study 
was similar to Altman’s, except he broadened the definition o f failure and he used a 
different set o f ratios. Edmister’s study also used multiple discriminant analysis, but his 
study only looked at smaller companies.
Robert O. Edmister, 1972
Edmister’s study was the first to focus on small business failure. He used a 
sample drawn fi’om Small Business Administration loans. Edmister tested five methods 
o f ratio analysis on a set o f 19 ratios. A ll the ratios were chosen fi-om ratios used in prior 
studies by Beaver, Altman and Blum. The first method tested was using the ratio itself as 
a predictor o f failure. The premise was that the level o f the ratio itself might be a 
predictor o f failure. To test his theory, Edmister compared the values o f individual ratios 
to the average ratio o f other small businesses in the same industry. The comparison 
showed that the failed firms’ ratios were consistently lower.
The second method tested was the accuracy o f a test using a three-year trend in 
the ratios. Only ratio values that went in the same direction all three years were 
considered trends. Upward trends were considered positive and downward trends were 
considered negative. Variables for up-trends and downtrends were assigned a value o f 
one i f  the ratios exhibited either an upward trend or a downward trend; otherwise those 
variables were assigned a value o f zero.
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The third test looked at the combination o f the ratio’s trend and the ratio value. 
The fourth test looked at the three-year average o f the ratios. The fifth  test looked at a 
combination o f the industry trend and the industry level o f the ratios, by dividing each 
ratio by the corresponding industry average ratio.
Edmister’s study did not result in an accurate ftmction for data within one year o f 
failure. However, an accurate prediction ftmction was developed using data three years 
prior to failure. This equation is shown below in Model 3.
The study achieved a classification accuracy o f 93%, with a Z-score below .47 
indicating failure, above .53 indicating non-failure and scores between those values being 
a “ gray zone”  similar to Altman’s. The most significant contribution o f Edmister’s study 
was the concept o f using industry averages to calculate standardized ratios and the 
converting o f the ratios to dichotomous variables, which added to the significance o f the 
results. (Edmister, 1972).
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Model 3
Edmister’s Small Finn Multiple Discriminate Analysis Model.
Z = 0.951 -  0.423X, -  0.293X2 -  0.482Xj + 0.277X»
0 .4 5 2 X 5 -  0.352X6 - 0 .9 2 4 X 7
Where Z = Overall Index
X i = I i f  funds flow/cunent liabilities < 0.05
= 0 otherwise
X 2 = 1 i f  equity/sales < 0.07
= 0 otherwise
X j = 1 i f  (net working capital/sales)/industry average ratio < -0.02
= 0 otherwise
X» = 1 i f  (current liabilities/equity )/industry average ratio < 0.48
= 0 otherwise
X 5 = 1 i f  (inventory/sales)/industry average ratio < 0.04 and
trends upward 
= 0  otherwise
Xô = 1 i f  quick ratio/industry average < 0.34 and trends
downward 
= 0  otherwise
X 7 = 1 i f  quick ratio/industry average trends upward
= 0  otherwise
(Edmister, 1972, p. 1487-1488).
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Marc Blum, 1974
Blum’s definition o f failure went beyond looking at just bankrupt firms. He also 
included firms that could not pay their debts when due and firms that had entered into an 
agreement to reduce debts. Using this definition, he was able to obtain a data set that 
contained 115 failed and 115 non-failed companies from the years 1954 to 1968.
As a framework for his study, Blum used a set o f six propositions for predicting 
failure that was very similar to the set o f propositions that Beaver had used. The first 
proposition was that the smaller the pool o f net liquid assets, the greater is the likelihood 
o f failure. The second proposition was that the smaller the inflow o f resources from 
operations the more likely the probability o f failure. The third proposition was that the 
larger the claims on the resources by creditors, the greater the probability o f failure. The 
fourth proposition was that the greater the outflow o f funds required by the operation o f 
the business the higher the probability o f failure. The fifth proposition was that the more 
highly variable earnings and claims against resources, as shown by outflows to maintain 
current operations and by obligations to creditors, the higher the probability o f failure. 
Finally, the more “ failure-prone”  the industry locations o f a firm ’s business activities are 
expected to be, the higher the likelihood o f failure.
To measure these propositions Blum grouped twelve ratios into three general 
classifications: liquidity, profitability and variability. He further broke down liquidity 
into short-run liquidity and long-run liquidity, and measured both the flow and the 
position o f each.
The ratios he used to measure short-term liquidity were the “ quick flow”  ratio and 
the ratio o f net quick assets to inventory. The “quick flow”  ratio was defined as cash +
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notes receivable + market securities + (annual sales ? 1 2 ) 4- (cost o f goods sold -  
depreciation expense + selling and administrative expense + interest) 4- 12. He defines 
net quick assets as cash and equivalents plus accounts and notes receivable less short­
term resource claims.
Long-run liquidity was measured by three ratios, cash flow to total liabilities, net 
worth at fair market value to total liabilities and net worth at book value to total 
liabilities. He used the harmonic mean o f the bounds o f the range o f stock prices during a 
year as the measure o f fair market value, in order to eliminate speculative upsurges in 
market value.
Profitability was measured as the rate o f return to common stockholders who 
invest for a minimum o f six years. Rate o f return was the internal rate o f return 
computed over the six years. Initial investment was defined as the average stock price 
during the first year and cash flows over the period were defined as dividends received 
plus a presumed sale at the end o f the six years in an amount equal to the average stock 
price for the sixth year.
Blum’s inclusion o f measures o f variability was the most extreme departure finm 
the conventional analyses. He used six ratios to determine variability and trend o f 
resource inflow and to determine the variability o f his short-term liquidity indicator -  net 
quick assets to inventory. For both net income and for the net quick assets to inventory 
ratio he computed the standard deviation over each year, trend breaks and slope. Trend 
breaks were defined as a decline in either net income or the ratio firom one year to the 
next. Slope is the trend line fitted to the observations using the least-squares method.
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Blum reported a 93-95 percent predictive accuracy for his model in the first year 
before failure. He found, like Beaver, that cash flow/total debt was the best predictor 
ratio. He also developed fimctions using raw accounting data, which had a better 
predictive accuracy than the models using ratios, but he offered no explanation for this, 
suggesting the need for additional research. He also suggested that his study indicated 
that the use o f non-traditional ratios and non-traditional approaches to looking at ratios 
might yield more discriminating results. Bliun did not publish his actual formulas for 
failure prediction, and none o f the other studies reviewed attempted to present a formula. 
(Blum, 1974).
James A. Ohlson, 1980
There have been several other studies that have attempted to improve on the 
ability to predict financial failure. The primary distinctions among these studies have 
been the method o f selecting the ratios to be used, the statistical technique used to 
evaluate the relationship o f the variables, the method o f selecting the data sample and the 
types o f businesses being reviewed.
In 1980, James Ohlson developed a model using the logit technique that was later 
to be used by Zavgren in her 1985 study. Ohlson cited three primary problems with prior 
studies that had been done using the more popular MDA technique. First he objected to 
the statistical requirements imposed on the distributional properties o f the ratios. Among 
these requirements were that the variance-covariance relationships o f the ratios had to be 
the same for both groups and that the predictors (ratios) had to be normally distributed. 
However, he also stated, “ A  violation o f these conditions, it could perhaps be argued, is
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unimportant (or simply irrelevant) i f  the only purpose o f the model is to develop a 
discriminating device”  (Ohlson, 1980, p. 112).
Ohlson also felt that the use o f a score, which is the output o f the MDA approach, 
was only a ranking method, and did not provide the opportunity for interpretation. 
Finally, he did not feel that the use o f the procedure o f matching failed and non-failed 
firms provided any benefit to an analysis. He felt that, “The use o f use o f conditional 
logit analysis, on the other hand, essentially avoids all the problems discussed with 
respect to MDA.”  (Ohlson, 1980, p. 112).
In addition to his preference for the logit analysis technique, Ohlson also objected 
to the data used in prior studies. He felt that by using financial statement information 
from Moody’s Manual, the source for most prior studies, no consideration had been given 
to the dates that information was available to the public. He noted that all the prior 
studies had assumed that the information was available as o f the date o f the financial 
statements, which is o f course not the case. To overcome this limitation, he used SEC 
reports that were dated.
According to Ohlson, “No attempt was made to select predictors on the basis o f 
rigorous theory. To put it m ildly, the state o f art seems to preclude such an approach.”  
(Ohlson, 1980, p .l 18).
Ohlson chose nine ratios for his analysis, based on “ simplicity” . Five o f the ratios 
were ones often cited in the literature; total liabilities divided by total assets, working 
capital divided by total assets, current liabilities divided by current assets, net income 
divided by total assets and funds provided by operations divided by total liabilities. He
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also used size o f the finn as defined by the equation: log(total assets/GNP price-level 
index).
He also used two variables that were defined as decision variables. One o f these 
variables compared total liabilities to total assets, assigning a value o f one if  liabilities 
exceed assets and zero otherwise. The other assigned a value o f one i f  net income was 
negative for the two years prior to failure and zero otherwise. The final factor measured 
the change in net income. The change was determined using the following formula: (NI, 
-  Nit.I  ) / 1 N it 1 +  1 Nlt-i I  ), where Nit is net income for the most recent period.
While Ohlson’s results were not as good as Altman’s or Deakin’s, he concluded 
that his methodology was more sound. He also reached some other interesting 
conclusions fi'om his study. He found that size o f the firm  was the most important 
predictor in his model, with financial structure being the next. Ohlson’s model is shown 
in Model 4.
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Model 4
Ohlson’s Logistic Regression Model.
Vi = -1.32 -  0.0407X, + 6.03X2 -  1.43X3 + 0.0757X4
2 .3 7 X 5 -  1.83X6 + 0.285X7- 1 .7 2 X 8 - 0 .5 2 1 X 9 
And
P = (1 + exp{-Yi}‘ ‘) so that V, = log[P/(l-P)]
Where P = Overall Probability o f Failure
X| = log (Total Assets/GNP price-level index)
X2 = Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
X 3  = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X 4  = Current Liabilities/Current Assets 
X 5  = Net Income/Total Assets 
Xô = Funds from Operations/Total Liabilities 
X 7  = I i f  net income was negative for the last two years 
= 0 otherwise 
Xs = 1 i f  total liabilities > total assets 
= 0 otherwise
X 9  = (N it -  Nlt-i)/1 N it I  +  I  Nlt-i I  ), where Nit is net income for the most recent 
period.
(Ohlson, 1980, p. 118-119).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
Rose and Giroux, 1984
Peter Rose and Gary Giroux developed a model in their 1984 study that used 
ratios that had not been used in previous studies. They developed 130 new ratios and 
tested a set o f 92 firms, 46 failed and 46 non-failed. Their analysis showed that 34 o f 
these ratios showed significant differences between the two groups.
They combined these 34 ratios with 27 ratios that had been used in other 
bankruptcy prediction studies. The ratios were then used in a MDA procedure that 
resulted in a model using 18 o f the ratios. O f these 18 ratios, 13 had not been used in 
prior models.
The study developed both a linear prediction equation and a quadratic prediction 
equation. The overall classification accuracy o f their model was 92%. The linear 
equation accurately classified the firms fi'om 8 8 % to 97.4% over the seven-year period o f 
the study. The quadratic equation’s accuracy ranged firom 74.5% to 86.7%. While the 
results were not consistent enough to make the model a more reliable predictor than 
either the Altman model or the Deakin model, there were some findings that could 
influence future studies.
The performance o f the new ratios they used indicates that creative ways o f 
choosing ratios could improve the accuracy o f new models. Their study also showed that 
the quadratic function had less variance than the linear function, perhaps indicating the 
need to include a quadratic equation in future studies (which Zavgren did in her study). 
The actual equation developed by Rose and Giroux was not presented in their study, only 
the results. (Rose &  Giroux, 1984).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
Christine V. Zavgren, 1985
Zavgren used a different statistical analysis technique than Altman and Deakin 
used. She used a technique called logit. Logit, like multiple discriminant analysis, is a 
multivariate technique that considers all the predictive factors in a problem taken 
simultaneously. Unlike MDA, logit weighs each o f the variables in such a way that the 
formula generates a probability o f classification o f the total set o f weighted variables into 
one o f two separate groups. MDA generates a linear relationship whose solution w ill 
maximize the difference between two possible classifications.
Zavgren chose the ratios to be used in her study based on a 1973 study by 
Pinches, Mingo and Caruthers that used factor analysis to identify the most appropriate 
grouping o f factors affecting a firm ’s financial position and financial performance. The 
seven areas their study showed as the most critical were return on investment, capital 
intensiveness, inventory intensiveness, financial leverage, receivables intensiveness, 
short-term liquidity and cash position, (Bukovinsky, 1993).
Using 48 separate ratios, Zavgren selected the seven ratios that provided the best 
measure for each o f the seven factors. The seven ratios were total income to total capital, 
sales to net plant, inventory to sales, debt to total capital, receivables to inventory, quick 
assets to current liabilities and cash to total assets. Zavgren’s final formula is shown in 
Model 5.
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Model 5
Zavgren’s Logistic Regression Model.
Yi = 0.23883 + 0.00486X, + 0.0011 IOX2 -  O.OOIO8 X 3 -  0.0435X4
0.01583X5 + 0.03074X6 -  0.1078X?
Where Yj = Overall Probability o f Failure
X] = Net Income/Total Equity
X 2 = Total Sales/Net Plant
X3 = Total Inventory/Total Sales
X4 = Total Liabilities/Total Equity
X5 = Total Receivables/Total Inventory
Xô = Quick Assets/Current Liabilities
X? = Total Cash/Total Assets
(Zavgren, 1985, p. 24,29).
According to Zavgren, the expected results o f her study were not supported by the 
analysis. The model she developed had less accurate results than the Altman model or 
the Deakin model. Using probabilities as a financial risk measure in the pattern o f the 
financial attributes and the information provided the primary significance o f her study. 
(Zavgren, 1983).
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Cash Flow Models
Prior to the issuance by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) o f 
Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards No. 95. Statement o f Cash Flows, in 1987, 
consistent information concerning actual cash flow was generally not available. The 
studies conducted prior to 1987 generally used a proxy for cash flow, net income plus 
depreciation, for their ratios that required a cash flow factor. In addition to ignoring the 
impact o f changes in other current assets and changes in current liabilities on cash flow 
from operations, the use o f net income plus depreciation also leaves out the funds 
provided/used in financing and investing activities. Measures o f actual cash flow were 
used in several bankruptcy studies during the I980’s. (Bukovinsky, 1993).
Unfortunately, the results o f the cash flow based studies showed very little 
incremental value to traditional accrual based prediction models (Altman, 1984). 
Although cash flow is considered in many o f the traditional bankruptcy prediction 
models, using information from accrual statements provides adequate information.
In the FASB Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 an objective o f 
financial accounting was said to be the providing to decision-makers o f useful 
information to assess the amount, timing and uncertainty o f future cash flows. The FASB 
and accounting academics agree that accrual accounting provides the best information 
about a firm ’s current and future performance (Shroff, 1998).
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Casey &  Bartczak, 1984 &  198S
In their first study, Casey and Bartczak used a sample o f 60 companies that filed 
for bankruptcy fitim  the period 1971-1982 and matched them with 230 non-failed 
companies. For each o f these companies they computed three variables, operating cash 
flow, operating cash flow divided by current liabilities and operating cash flow divided 
by total liabilities.
Their conclusion was, “ that none o f the variables could discriminate between the 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies w ith reasonably good accuracy. In fact, overall 
accuracy for operating cash flow was only slightly better than chance (50%) for the first 
and second years before failure and was worse than chance for the remaining years”  
(Casey &  Bartczak, 1984, p.64).
In a letter to the editor o f the Harvard Business Review, Edward Altman 
commented on Casey &  Bartczak’s study. “ Casey and Bartczek are absolutely correct in 
their assertion that OCF or its variation measures are poor predictors o f insolvency, either 
by themselves or as parts o f a multivariate model o f the type that I have been discussing 
ever since the original Z-score approach for bankruptcy prediction was developed. 
Indeed, my own skepticism about liquidity measiues in general and cash flow variables in 
particular has caused me to almost eliminate them fix>m consideration”  (Altman, 1984, p. 
176).
In a follow-up study, Casey and Bartczak tested the effect o f adding operating 
cash flow information to existing accrual-based models in order to enhance their 
predictive ability. The results again showed that the operating cash flow data do not 
provide incremental predictive power over accrual-based ratios. They suggested that a
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broader definition o f cash flows, like total cash flow might lead to improved 
classification accuracy. (Casey &  Bartczak, 1985).
Gentry, Newbold &  Whitford, 1985
Using a matched sample o f 33 failed and 33 non-failed companies. Gentry, 
Newbold &  Whitford used both MDA and logit techniques to analyze eight funds flow 
variables. The eight variables were funds provided by operations, flows provided by 
changes in working capital, fixed coverage expenses (interest and rent), funds used for 
capital expenditures, dividends, other asset and liability flows and change in cash and 
marketable securities.
Using a probit model to develop a formula that predicts the probability o f failure 
for each o f the firms, they were only able to achieve 79% accuracy in predicting failure 
using their funds flow variables. They also tested the effect o f combining accrual-based 
ratios to their model. Their conclusion was “that the addition o f cash-based funds flow 
components to the traditional financial ratios used to discriminate between failed and 
non-failed companies results in significantly improved predictive performance”  (Gentry, 
Newbold &  Whitford, 1985).
However, according to Bukovinsky, “ this conclusion is based only on the 
statistical significance o f the models. The ultimate test o f the incremental predictive 
ability o f the models would involve the use o f the models to classify a sample o f firms 
and to compare the classification accuracies o f the models. No such test o f the 
comparative classification accuracies o f the models was performed" (Bukovinsky, 1993).
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Aziz &  Lawson, 1988
Aziz and Lawson fonnally tested the differences between the predictive accuracy 
o f Altman’s Z and Zeta models, a cash flow based model and a model that combines the 
cash flow based model with Altman’s Z-model. What they found was that in the first 
year before failure the combined model showed better classification accuracy than that 
shown by any o f the other three models. However, in terms o f overall accuracy they 
foimd that the ability to discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms was about 
the same for all the models.
In terms o f predictive accuracy, the cash flow model and the combined model 
were superior to either the Z-model or the Zeta model, particularly in the second through 
the fifth  years before failure. Their conclusion was that while the study showed mixed 
results, it did indicate that cash flow information was important and should be considered 
in future studies. (Aziz, Emanuel &  Lawson, 1988; Aziz &  Lawson, 1989).
Summary o f Traditional Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
While there are many studies that have been conducted in the field o f predicting 
business failure and many failure prediction models developed, there is no consensus on 
which model is the best or which variables are the most effective. A limitation on all o f 
the studies has been the lack o f sufficient data to perform extensive testing or satisfactory 
validation procedures.
The studies o f bankruptcy prediction that have been done in the past have 
concentrated on identifying the symptoms o f a failed firm, what a failed firm  looks like
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
after it has entered into a failure mode, rather than what has caused the failure. 
Additional research into the underlying causes o f failure could potentially help prevent 
bankruptcy rather than just predicting it.
A  recent study evaluating existing bankruptcy prediction models showed that no 
one model in the existing literature was entirely satisfactory at differentiating between 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The study concluded that the difierent models might 
have different uses and that the challenge for new research is to make fu ll use o f all 
readily available data within a better model o f the bankruptcy process. (Mossman. 1998).
Application o f Traditional Models to the Casino Industry
In a study o f the effectiveness o f three o f the traditional bankruptcy prediction 
models for predicting failure and non-failure in the casino business, it was shown that 
none o f the models predicted bankruptcy with any greater accuracy than a naïve 
prediction (Patterson, 1999).
In the study, the three models chosen for the analysis were the models developed 
by Edward 1. Altman, the models developed by Edward Deakin and the model developed 
by Christine Zavgren. Each o f the models was tested using published financial data for 
an equal number o f failed and non-failed casinos.
The Altman model was chosen because it is generally considered the landmark 
model in bankruptcy prediction; it was the first published study that used multi-variant 
analysis to study the differences between failed and non-failed firms, by using multiple 
ratios simultaneously. The Altman model, which was first published in 1968, is s till the 
most widely used and widely quoted bankruptcy prediction model.
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The Deakin model was used because it is another early multi-variant analysis 
model that is generally cited and used as a standard for evaluating new approaches to 
bankruptcy prediction. It uses different ratios than the Altman model and may produce 
different results when applied to gaming analysis.
The Zavgren model was chosen because it uses a different approach than either 
the Altman or the Deakin model, and may yield different conclusions from those o f the 
other two models.
The basis for evaluating the contributions o f the models was a naive prediction. 
The naïve prediction would be that in a sample population that contained exactly the 
same number o f failed and non-failed firms, assigning an individual firm  to one group or 
another on a random basis would, on average, result in a correct classification 50% o f the 
time (Patterson, 1999).
The Altman model had an accuracy rate o f 50% one year prior to bankruptcy and 
58% two years prior. These results do not suggest any incremental value to the 
prediction decision. The major weakness o f the Altman model is that it predicts failure 
for all but two firms in each o f the two years tested. While it is generally agreed that a 
type two error, predicting failure for a non-failing firm, is less costly than a type one 
error, predicting failure in all cases except absolutely certain successes would preclude 
almost all investment decisions.
The Deakin models presented different results. Deakin’s linear model has an 
overall accuracy rate o f 79% one year prior to failure and 75% two years prior. While 
these results are clearly superior to the results o f a naïve selection process, they do not 
come close to the 97.5% success rate he achieved in his original study. The other two
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models do not come close to the accuracy o f a naïve selection process. The quadratic 
function only achieved an accuracy rate o f 29% one year prior to failure and 42% two 
years prior. The combined model results were 29% and 33% respectively for one and 
two years prior to failure.
Like the Altman model’s variables, the Deakin model variables are heavily 
influenced by the value o f the total assets o f the firm. In the linear equation, the highest 
weight is attributed to the net income to total assets ratio, which measures the return on 
the total investment. This relationship is not considered in any o f the other models, and 
may explain the reason this model exhibits the best prediction accuracy o f all the models. 
By comparing net income to total assets, which is the same as total investment, both the 
needs o f the equity holders and the debt holders are considered. This would tend to 
indicate that the casino’s ability to generate or not generate an appropriate return could 
represent a good predictor o f its likelihood o f success.
The significance o f cash and o f current assets relative to the total capitalization o f 
the casinos is the primary reason for the failure o f the quadratic equation to accurately 
predict failure in the casino business. The required levels o f cash in the casino industry 
are highly dependent upon regulatory requirements, and do not really vary significantly 
between a successful firm and an unsuccessful firm. The levels o f cash and working 
capital are to the Deakin model, as in the Altman model, important factors about which 
the casino industry should probably be more attentive, but they do not appear to be 
significant discriminators between failing and non-failing firms.
The relationships o f the Deakin quadratic model do not appear to provide any 
discriminating information concerning the viability o f a casino. According to Deakin, all
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the casinos are going to fail. Due to the differences in predictive ability between his 
linear model and his quadratic model it would appear that the primary distinguishing 
characteristic is the return on investment, and that the coefficients o f the quadratic model 
are not appropriate for casinos.
The Zavgren model has the lowest classification accuracy o f the three models. 
One year prior to failure, the model only classified 75% o f the firms at all, and then 
correctly classified only 21% o f those. Two years out classified a higher percentage o f 
the firms, 96%, but only did slightly better at classification, 29%. This accuracy level is 
significantly lower than what would be expected fi'om a naïve classification.
The Zavgren model uses inventory levels in two o f the variables o f the model. In 
the casino business, inventory levels are not as important as they would be in a 
manufacturing or a retailing firm. Relationships between inventory levels and sales 
would generally not be indicative o f any poor management decisions in the casino 
business.
The return on equity ratio also does not seem to work for a casino. Because o f the 
high leverage rates o f many casinos, equity holders may appear to be achieving 
acceptable returns i f  the debt holders are ignored. Since this is the effect o f computing 
return on equity without any return on liabilities or total investment being considered, the 
result is non-discrimination. The other ratios in the Zavgren equation reflect the same 
measurement problems o f the casino industry as seen in the Altman and Deakin models.
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Summary o f Literature Review
While accounting records in the United States date back to its earliest days, it was 
not until the end o f the nineteenth century that accounting finally began to emerge as a 
profession. One impetus o f this emergence was the growing need for reliable financial 
records as the country moved from a primarily agricultural and mercantile economy to an 
industrial economy.
The transition o f the country’s economy was accompanied by a heightened 
interest in measuring the financial condition and stability o f companies. The first ratio 
used to measure a firm ’s financial condition was the current ratio in the early 1900’s. 
During the 1920’s and 1930’s, several additional ratios were developed to provide a more 
comprehensive means o f evaluating companies. New methodologies o f analyzing these 
ratios were also developed and the process o f distinguishing between failed and non- 
failed companies through various manipulations were also developed and studied.
Beginning with the work o f Beaver in 1966, statistical analysis o f multiple 
financial ratios began to be used for predicting business success or failure. Edward 
Altman developed the first analysis o f a combination o f financial ratios, using multiple 
discriminant analysis, in 1968. Since that time several other studies have been done that 
have looked at various industries and that have used several different statistical 
techniques. None o f these studies was done specifically for predicting failure or non­
failure in the casino business. Patterson’s study (1999) examined the results o f using 
three o f the most recognized bankruptcy prediction models to test failed and non-failed 
casinos.
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The traditional bankruptcy prediction models tested do not provide significant 
incremental information for predicting bankruptcy in the casino industry. Only a part o f 
one o f the models showed results that were superior to what would be expected from a 
naïve classification. A possible explanation for the inability o f the models to perform 
adequately in the casino industry is that the original studies were done using 
manufacturing companies, which typically exhibit financial structures that are different 
than what is seen in the casino industry.
The Altman Z score, which is often quoted in investment banker reports has been 
widely used in all types o f businesses, including casinos, had an accuracy classification 
rate o f only 50% in year one o f the test, and 58% in year two. While it accurately 
predicted failure for 92% o f the firms that failed, it did this at the expense o f erroneously 
predicting failure in 92% o f the firms that did not fail. The same rate would have been 
achieved by saying that all casinos are going to fail.
The Deakin linear model did better than the Altman model, achieving a prediction 
accuracy rate o f 79% in year one and 75% in year two. While this represents a positive 
contribution to overall knowledge o f the firm ’s total financial information, the rates and 
types o f errors can confuse this information. The type one errors were fairly high at 25% 
and 33%, and would probably not represent an acceptable level relative to the risk o f 
investing in a firm  that is likely to fail.
The Deakin quadratic model and the combined results model did not perform as 
well as a naïve prediction, at 29% in year one and 42% and 33% for year two. The 
models also produced conflicting results in three o f the years. The type two errors were 
higher than the type one errors in both years for the quadratic model, at 100% and 92%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
versus 42% and 25%, but both types o f errors are higher than acceptable. While the error 
rates were higher in the combined model, only 46% o f the firms were classified.
The Zavgren model achieved the lowest classification accuracy at 21% and 29% 
for year one and year two respectively. The Zavgren model also had a high rate o f non­
classified firms, 25% in year one and 4% in year two. The type two errors for those firms 
classified by the Zavgren model were 100% in each test period and 33% type one errors 
in year two. The accuracy level would have been much higher by simply saying that all 
casinos w ill fail.
The conclusion o f this literature review is that there is a need for a bankruptcy 
prediction model that is developed specifically for the casino industry. Since none o f the 
traditional approaches seems to work better than the Altman Z score model, the statistical 
approach used by Altman seems to be appropriate for this analysis.
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CHAPTERS
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose o f this study was to develop a model, which would differentiate 
between casinos that are likely to fail and those that are likely to succeed, by using the 
financial ratios o f the casinos. The first step in the process was to make a determination 
as to what the critical factors might be that distinguish the two groups o f firms. What is 
different between a successful casino and an unsuccessful casino? The development o f 
the constructs o f the model and the development o f a theoretical model are discussed in 
this chapter.
The next step in the development o f the differentiation model was to examine the 
information that is available that could be used to measure the factors that have been 
identified as constructs for the model. For this study this step in the process was 
complicated because o f the data source that was utilized. The procedures that were used 
to select and obtain the data for the study are discussed in this chapter.
Finally a statistical method had to be selected to analyze the numbers and develop 
the actual differentiation model. To select the appropriate method, the model 
assumptions had to be examined relative to the information that was to be used. The 
alternatives and final determination o f model choice are discussed in this chapter.
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together with a discussion o f the methods that were used to evaluate the results o f that 
modeling effort.
A possible outcome o f this study is that a model cannot be developed that w ill 
significantly differentiate between casinos that are likely to fail and those that are likely 
to succeed. An alternative outcome is that the model does significantly differentiate 
between the two groups o f casinos.
Development o f Theoretical Model
In addressing the question o f what distinguishes failed and non-failed casinos, 
there is obviously no simple answer. Failure can occur in any business for numerous 
reasons and at other times it occurs for no apparent reason. In order to determine likely 
characteristics o f failed firms versus non-failed firms, a qualitative analysis was 
performed. This consisted o f interviews o f casino industry experts who had experience 
with failed and non-failed firms.
Although the interviews were open-ended discussions and not structured question 
and answer sessions, the same basic concepts were discussed in each Interview. Each 
interviewee was asked about his personal experience and observations o f failed casinos 
and non-failed casinos. What were the primary differences in the two groups? What 
types o f controllable factors may have led to the failure o f certain casinos. Why do some 
casinos fail while others do not. What types o f operational adjustments are typically 
made after a casino enters bankruptcy protection? What would they look at to determine 
the likelihood that a particular casino would fa il in the future?
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The groups o f industry experts that are involved with financial statements on an 
almost daily basis are the casino industry independent auditors, accountants and 
investment bankers. The independent auditors who were interviewed for this study are 
senior parmers for two o f the leading CPA firms in the casino industry. Steve Comer is 
the senior partner responsible for the gaming practice o f Arthur Anderson, which has 
been responsible for the audits for munerous gaming companies, including Harrahs, 
Hilton, MGM, Mandalay Resort Group and Caesars. Jeff Cooper is the managing parmer 
for Bradshaw Smith, which is a Las Vegas based CPA firm that has been extremely 
involved in the casino industry in Las Vegas for many years.
Other CPA’s that were interviewed concerning their thoughts and opinions on 
bankruptcy in the casino business were Saul Leonard, Larry Bertsch and David Vorce. 
Saul Leonard was the senior gaming industry parmer for the CPA firm  o f Laventhol and 
Horwath, and now has his own gaming consulting business in Los Angeles. Larry 
Bertsch is a Las Vegas CPA who now serves at a court appointed bankruptcy trustee. He 
was the controller for the management company that ran both the Aladdin Casino and the 
Marina Casino during their bankruptcy periods. David Vorce was a senior manager with 
the Bradshaw Smith firm.
Two senior analysts for investment banking firms that have large gaming clientele 
were also interviewed. Jason Adler is a senior gaming industry analyst for Bear Steams. 
He has been responsible for financing o f both successful and failed casinos and is a well- 
known and respected expert on gaming financial information. Bruce Turner is a senior 
gaming industry analyst for the Smith Barney firm.
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Numerous gaming industry executives were also interviewed to get their 
perspectives on bankruptcy in the casino industry. W illiam Dougall is the former 
president o f Del Webb Nevada and has managed both bankrupt and very successful 
casinos. W illiam was appointed by the bankruptcy trustee and approved by the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board to manage both the Marina Casino and the Aladdin Casino when 
they were in bankruptcy. In both cases, the casinos were turned around financially under 
his management. Mr. Dougall’s insights into the real-world experiences o f turning 
around a bankrupt casino were invaluable to the development o f the constructs that were 
identified for this study.
The process o f seeking expert opinions on bankruptcy was ongoing for more than 
two years and involved many people. Shannon Bybee is the Executive Director o f the 
UNLV International Gaming Institute, a member o f the Board o f Directors o f the 
Claridge Casino (currently in Chapter 11), the former President o f the Golden Nugget 
Casino and the Claridge Casino in Atlantic City and a former member o f the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board. Jim Palmer works for the audit division o f the Nevada Gaming 
Control Board and maintains a database o f financial information on gaming licensees, 
including a bankruptcy prediction analysis performed on the annual reports o f the casino 
companies. Bob Fry is the CFO for Global Cash Access; he was the CFO for the Gold 
Strike properties owned by B ill Ensign and became the Assistant Treasurer o f 
Circus/Circus after the merger o f Gold Strike and Circus. H.S. Duffy Stanley, Jr. is the 
bankruptcy trustee for Southern Mississippi who was assigned as the receiver for the 
three bankrupt riverboats in Southern Mississippi (the Palace, Treasure Bay and the Belle 
o f B iloxi).
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Pulling together all the infoimatioa related by this informal group o f experts, 
there were several specific items that were identified consistently. Grouping the 
responses according to similarity, five constructs were identified that seem to represent 
the consensus o f what described the primary indicators o f business success or failure. 
These five constructs are: Management, Location, Ambiance, Marketing and Financial 
Strength. The next step in developing a theoretical model was to define what observed 
variables would represent each o f the constructs and what empirical data would need to 
be collected to measure each o f the observed variables. Constraining the decision making 
process o f selecting empirical data to be used in the model was the availability o f data. In 
some cases an alternative ratio had to be chosen when some other measure might have 
been more informative simply because there was no way to get at the data. A graphic 
representation o f theoretical model is shown in Figure Two, Figure Three, Figure Four 
Figure Five and Figure Six below.
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The Management construct relates to the operating areas o f the business that are 
controlled by the property’s management. The experts all agreed that the majority o f 
bankrupt casinos do not adequately control their operating costs. In order to measure 
overall control o f operating costs the operating margin was used, which is operating 
income divided by total revenues. According to Steffy, Zearley and Strunk (1974), the 
operating margin ratio indicates management’s ability to control costs.
The theory behind using the operating margin to measure overall operating 
efficiency is that the ratio represents a generalized way o f looking at the total operation, 
and is not dependent upon a particular mix o f revenue sources or the size o f the 
operation. Although operating costs do have a fixed component, which tends to make a 
larger operation have a better operating margin than a smaller operation, casinos do not 
have many operating costs that are fixed at different revenue levels, the costs are 
primarily variable and therefore this measure should adequately measure operating 
efficiency. It is believed that a successful casino would have a higher operating margin 
than would an unsuccessfiil casino.
Payroll costs are the largest operating expense in any casino, and by measuring 
the amount o f payroll costs as a percentage o f sales the efficiency o f payroll cost control 
relative to the level o f business is possible. While this measure is important when 
looking at two casinos o f the same size, it does not provide for any differences in payroll 
that might be attributable to the size o f the facility (there would be both positive and 
negative results that could result from a bigger or smaller casino). The other payroll 
efficiency measure, payroll costs to total assets, is designed to measure the level o f staff 
relative to the size o f the casino. By utilizing two ratios, the economies o f scale that
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might make a bigger casino more efficient are softened, and the additional staff necessary 
to operate the bigger casino is taken into consideration.
The second construct is location. The problem with this construct was how to 
measure the quality o f one location versus another. A ll the experts agreed that there were 
casinos that they knew o f where location had been a factor in the failure o f the property. 
This factor seems to be more o f a qualitative assessment than a quantitative one, and 
therefore a rating scale was used to measure location. The scale used was a 5-point 
Lickert scale, with 1 being poor, 2 below average 3 average, 4 above average and 5 
prime. Some o f the qualities that were considered in rating each property were such 
things as proximity to other casinos, quality o f neighborhood, ease o f access and distance 
from target market. The measure is strictly a subjective judgment, but represents an 
overall assessment o f the property’s location.
Ambiance has to do with the overall feel o f the property. It was generally felt that 
one o f the things that happen to a property is that the customer does not like the décor, 
cleanliness, and/or general quality o f a property. While this too is a somewhat subjective 
distinction, it was felt that there were some measurable things that happen that cause a 
property to have an uncomfortable feel. One o f the things that happens to properties in 
an effort to save money is the deferral o f maintenance programs. The result o f a 
sustained program o f deferred maintenance is that the property falls into disrepair. Not 
only do mechanical problems begin to occur, the brightness and cleanliness o f the 
property begin to suffer. Another thing that can happen to a property that could create an 
ambiance that is not attractive to customers occurs when capital replacements are not 
made when they are needed. This situation can cause a distressed situation or could be a
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reaction to being in a distressed situation. Excessive capital replacements might also be a 
cause o f financial distress i f  the level is more than can be supported by the property.
To measure the level o f deferred maintenance and the level o f capital 
replacements, it was decided to compare the maintenance costs and the capital spending 
to the total assets o f the company, not including capital replacements for expansion o f 
facilities. This method gives a perspective o f how much is being spent for maintenance 
and for capital replacements relative to the total overall magnitude o f the facility. A third 
observed variable that was added was a qualitative assessment o f the facility. As with 
location, this measure is a subjective judgment about the overall feeling o f the facility. A 
five-point Lickert scale was used for this variable, with 1 representing an old or poorly 
maintained facility, 2 being a substandard facility, 3 was for average facilities. 4 for a 
relatively new, well maintained facility and 5 being a superior facility.
The fourth success/failure construct is marketing. The general opinion o f the 
experts is that when properties start having financial difficulties, one o f the first areas that 
face reductions is the area o f marketing costs. It was felt that neglecting a marketing 
program would soon lead to a diminution o f customer awareness and an erosion o f the 
property’s ability to attract new customers. To measure the marketing effort the relative 
amount o f marketing expenditures to sales was computed. While this measure does not 
address the effectiveness o f the marketing effort, at least it tells whether or not there is 
some type o f marketing program being pursued and how that effort on a cost basis 
compares firom one property to another. The other empirical measure is marketing 
efficiency measured in the analysis is total sales to assets. This measure when compared 
to other companies w ill show i f  the sales level adjusted for the size o f the investment is in
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line between successful and unsuccessful companies. Marketing effectiveness could also 
be measured as a qualitative variable, but it seemed that this was just too subjective to try 
to measure.
The final construct is Financial Strength. The observed variables that measure 
this construct are traditional financial ratios that have been used in other prediction 
models to measure financial strength; Leverage, Solvency, Return and Liquidity. These 
types o f ratios have consistently been utilized in previous bankruptcy studies (Jones, 
1987).
Leverage refers to the financing mix o f the company, how much o f the overall 
investment comes firom creditors and how much comes firom the owners. In general, 
creditors want the owners to have a large enough investment so that the creditor position 
is protected in the case o f liquidation. Owners on the other hand want as much debt as 
possible (as long as the rate is lower than the required return on equity level) so that they 
can have a fixed level o f return that has to be paid on that investment and so they can 
deduct the payments made on that portion o f the investment. Also, i f  the venture is 
profitable, debt holders generally do not share in the profits above their predetermined 
interest rate. The ratio o f debt to equity was used as the empirical data to measure this 
variable. According to Stefify, Zearley and Strunk (1974), this ratio measures the relative 
amount o f capital supplied by the owners and too high o f a ratio can increase the 
authority o f the creditors, decrease the freedom o f management and burden the company 
with interest payments.
Solvency refers to the firm ’s ability to repay its debts when they become due. 
Solvency is different than liquidity or profitability. Solvency relates to a firm ’s ability to
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sustain an operating cash flow that w ill service its debts as they become due in the future. 
Liquidity refers to the structure o f a firm ’s assets, how much o f the total assets are cash or 
can be converted to cash, and how that cash relates to the total liabilities o f the firm. 
Profitability relates to the measurement o f income, the amount by which revenues exceed 
expenses (or the inverse in the case o f an unprofitable company). Since profitability is 
not based on cash or when cash might be ultimately realized, profitability does not 
indicate whether a firm can pay its debts, though certainly sustained lack o f profits would 
make it d ifficu lt for a company to be able to pay its bills eventually. Solvency is affected 
by many factors, including the amount o f the company’s asset base, the level o f its 
existing debt, the amount o f cash it is generating and the amount it w ill generate in the 
future. For purposes o f this study, the ratio that was chosen was cash flow from 
operations as a percentage o f total liabilities. While this ratio does not address the long­
term ability o f the firm to meet its future obligations, it does provide a measure that is at 
least representative o f the amount by which the current cash flow is capable o f meeting 
existing obligations.
Return refers to the income that is made by the company. Return can be 
compared to debt levels, equity levels, revenue levels, asset levels or most any other 
financial measurement. By using net income to assets to measure return, the portion o f 
debt or equity does not have to be considered. Other measures were not considered since 
they were being considered elsewhere in the analysis o f financial strength. It is felt that 
overall acceptability o f a level o f return should be related to the total investment in the 
company by all o f its stakeholders.
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Liquidity is the amount o f cash the company has relative to the amount it needs to 
meet its current obligations. While a firm does not need to have cash equal to all its 
obligations, it does need to be able to pay those obligations that are due or w ill become 
due in the short term. Not having enough cash w ill seriously impede the ability o f a 
company to negotiate favorable purchasing arrangements, it may lead the company to 
make short term decisions that are not in the best interests o f the company simply 
because o f the cash situation not for sound business reasons and it may keep the company 
from pursuing activities that could make the business more successful.
Financial Data Used in Study
The primary limitation o f this study was the availability o f consistently prepared 
financial information from failed and non-failed casinos. Casino managers and owners 
are traditionally very sensitive to revealing financial information about their operations. 
People whose lives were often shrouded in secrecy and who had very little  trust o f 
anyone outside their own organization began the industry. This tradition o f secrecy still 
continues.
For a previous study, data from public reports was used to test the accuracy o f the 
Altman, Deakin and Zavgren models for predicting casino failure. This information was 
obtained from old annual reports and from SEC filings. While these reports provided 
sufficient information to test these historical models, which had been originally 
developed using information from public documents, there was not sufficient information 
available in these reports to conduct the current study.
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Even i f  the information that was needed had been available from these sources, 
there are only a small group o f casinos that are required to file this type o f report. Also 
there are no consistent standards for the ways the information in these reports are 
presented. Public financial statements are typically presented in a very abbreviated 
format.
Individual state regulatory agencies each have reporting requirements for the 
casinos in their jurisdiction. Only three o f these jurisdictions have had casinos that meet 
the criteria o f failure: Mississippi, Atlantic City and Nevada. O f these three jurisdictions, 
only Atlantic City makes data on individual casinos available to the public. Nevada and 
Mississippi both have provisions in their casino laws that specifically prohibit the release 
o f property specific data. While most o f the information for creating a model based on 
the constructs identified for this study could be obtained from the reports o f Atlantic City 
casinos, there have not been enough cases o f bankruptcy in Atlantic City (only Resorts 
International, the Atlantis, the Sands: Create Bay, and the Claridge) to perform a 
meaningful study using only their data. Mississippi has also had a few bankruptcies; 
Splash, B iloxi Belle, Treasure Bay, the Sahara and the Palace, but again not a sufficient 
number to do a valid study (even i f  the information was available on these properties, 
which it is not). Nevada has had several casino bankruptcies through the years, but 
Nevada law prohibits the release o f individual casino financial data.
Since Nevada is the only state with a sufficient number o f bankrupt casinos to 
allow an analysis o f data that is prepared under exactly the same set o f guidelines, it was 
the only logical choice as a possible source o f data.
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In the state o f Nevada, all casinos with gross revenue o f $ 1  m illion or more are 
required to submit to the Nevada Gaming Control Board an annual information report. 
This report includes detailed information concerning the financial operating results and 
the financial status o f the casino. Aggregated information from these reports is made 
available to the public through Gaming Board publications and press releases. But, as 
stated earlier, state law prohibits the release o f data that could possibly identify financial 
information as belonging to any specific casino.
Two significant factors in being able to obtain the release o f data for this study 
were that the format (ratios) provided assurance o f the confidentiality o f individual 
property identities and the fact that the data being requested was for purposes o f 
academic research and would be beneficial to both the state and the casino industry in 
general.
Three o f the items needed to compute the ratios in a traditional manner are not 
included in the reports filed by the casinos, and substitutions were necessary. The three 
items were capital spending, cash flow from operations and marketing costs. Using the 
data that was included in the casino reports, acceptable definitions for these three items 
were determined.
For capital spending, balance sheet information was used. Capital spending was 
approximated by taking the change in gross property and equipment plus building 
(excluding construction in progress) from one year to the next.
Cash flow from operations was defined as net income (excluding extraordinary 
items), plus depreciation and amortization, minus the net increase in current assets plus 
the net increase in current liabilities. While not 100% accurate, this approximation is the
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ordinary definition o f cash flow firom operations as long as there are no gains or losses on 
sales o f assets or treasury stock included in the net income number.
Marketing costs are not reported on the annual report, but advertising and 
promotion costs are reported. Since the advertising and promotion figure contains most 
o f the marketing costs except for marketing payroll, which is included with the total 
payroll costs, the number seemed like an appropriate measure o f sales effort. Payroll 
costs are included in the staffing levels and staff costs ratios, so they are not being 
ignored in the analysis, only aggregated.
Once the data requirements were determined, the set o f casinos from which the 
data would be collected were identified. The Gaming Board’s database o f financial 
information in its current format is only available for the years after 1985. A ll the 
casinos that had declared bankruptcy since that time were selected as the failed firms. 
This list consisted o f 16 casinos. Due to the confidentiality requirement, the identity o f 
these casinos was not provided with the data.
For each o f the failed casinos, it was agreed that the ratios would be based on the 
reports for each o f the two years before the year they entered the bankruptcy process. 
Ratios for each o f these two years were provided separately.
In order to minimize the differences between the failed casinos and the non-failed 
casinos that would be used in the modeling process, five parameters were agreed to for 
the selection o f the non-failed casinos. First, one non-failed casino would be selected to 
correspond to each failed casino. Second, the non-failed casino would be one o f 
approximately the same size (based on square footage o f casino space) as its 
corresponding failed casino. Third, the corresponding failed and non-failed casinos
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
would be located in approximately the same market area. Fourth, the two casinos would 
have similar amenities (i.e. i f  the failed casino had a hotel so would the non-failed casino, 
or i f  the failed casino did not have a hotel neither would its non-failed correspondent). 
Finally, the ratios for the non-failed casino would be computed based on the same year’s 
report as its corresponding failed casino. As with the failed casinos, the identity o f the 
non-failed casinos was not disclosed due to confidentiality requirements.
Since the identities o f the casinos were not known, except to the Gaming Control 
Board, the two subjective evaluations (quality o f location and quality o f property) were 
also provided by them. The Board agreed to be as objective as possible and to try to 
employ the same sort o f criteria when scoring each casino for each o f the two years o f the 
dataset.
While the resulting dataset is not very large, it has as many observations as many 
o f the traditional bankruptcy prediction studies, and should be sufficient to provide a 
meaningful analysis. Only Nevada data w ill be used in the creation o f the model, due to 
its consistency. Data from casino financials that are not part o f the design o f the model 
w ill be used as a holdout sample to test the accuracy o f the model.
Statistical Method Used for Analysis 
Many bankruptcy prediction studies have used a discriminant analysis method for 
developing the model that they used to predict business failure. This statistical technique 
is a multivariate method o f data analysis. Edward Altman (1967) was the first person 
who used discriminant analysis for the classification o f firms into failed and non-failed 
categories. This 1967 study resulted in the Altman Z score model that is widely used in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
finance textbooks and in the business world to this day. Although the method has been 
criticized over the years, most o f the critics have not been able to attain the classification 
accuracy o f the Altman Z score model even with more sophisticated techniques (Zavgren, 
1985; Deakin, 1972).
R. A. Fisher first proposed the discriminant analysis approach in 1936 as a 
statistical tool for use in the classification o f plants (Tatsuoka, 1970). The goal o f 
discriminant function analysis is to predict group membership into one o f two or more 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories from a set o f predictor or classification 
variables. Classification is done by means o f a linear discriminant function; y = b,x, + 
biX2 + ... + bnXn; where Xj = the i*’’ predictor variable, bj = the coefficient value o f x„ and 
y = the discriminant score (Von Frederikslust, 1978, p. 5). The discriminate function 
solution is determined by finding the discriminate score, which best differentiates 
between two groups where the classification o f each group member is known. A 
distribution o f the scores for each group is developed and the point at which the overlap 
o f the distributions o f the two groups is sufficiently insignificant becomes the cutoff for 
membership in the other group (see Figure 1). The form o f the model to be used in this 
analysis is presented in Model 6 .
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Model 6
Form  o f  m ode l fo r  casino b ankrup tcy  p re d ic tio n
P red ic tion  Score =  P ,X , +  P2X2 +  P3X3 +  P4X4 - P5X5 - PôX ô -  P7X7 +  PsX* +  pgXg +
P ioX io -  P i i X i i  -  P12X12 -  G
W here:
X i =  M a rke tin g  C osts /T o ta l Revenues 
X2 =  N e t Incom e/T o ta l Assets 
X3 =  T o ta l R evenues/Tota l Assets 
X4 =  O pera ting  M a rg in  
X5 =  P a yro ll C osts/T o ta l Revenues 
Xô =  P a yro ll C osts /T o ta l Assets
X 7  =  %  Change in  M a rke tin g  C osts /T o ta l Revenues R a tio  
Xg =  %  Change in  Cash B a la n ce /L ia b ilitie s  R atio  
Xq =  % Change in  T o ta l R evenues/To ta l Assets R atio  
X io  =  %  Change in  O pera ting  M a rg in  R a tio  
Xi I =  %  Change in  P a y ro ll C osts /T o ta l Revenues R a tio  
X12 =  %  Change in  P a y ro ll C osts /T o ta l Assets R atio  
s =  E rro r o r constant
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“ Classification makes fewer statistical demands than does inference”  (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996, p. 512), however there are some assumptions about the predictor variables 
that need to be considered. The sample size o f the smallest group should exceed the 
number o f predictor variables (Tabachnick &  Fidell, 1996). There is an assumption o f 
multivariate normality, which means that the sampling distribution o f any linear 
combination o f predictors is normally distributed, but using discriminant analysis for 
classification is not very sensitive to violations o f normality (Hair, Anderson, Tatham &  
Black, 1998). Discriminant analysis is very sensitive to outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996).
Discriminant analysis for purposes o f classification is sensitive to heterogeneity o f 
variance-covariance matrices. I f  heterogeneity is found, the predictors can be 
transformed, separate covariance matrices can be used for classification, quadratic 
discriminate fimction analysis or nonparametric classification can be used (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996).
Discriminant analysis assumes linear relationships among all pairs o f predictors 
within each group, however a violation does not increase the likelihood o f a Type 1 error. 
Multicollinearity or singularity may occur i f  the predictor variables are redundant, 
making matrix inversion unreliable (Hair, Anderson, Tatham &  Black, 1998).
The logistic regression approach avoids many o f these constraints o f discriminant 
analysis and is another approach that has been used in bankruptcy prediction. The 
difficulty w ith using a logistic regression approach is that the model equation w ill contain 
log transformations o f the variables used in the analysis, which do not display as directly 
the impacts o f changes in the various components o f the equation. The results would
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tend to be more difficult for a non-statistician to understand and interpret. In the studies 
that have used logistic regression, the classification accuracy has not been as good as that 
achieved by those studies that used discriminant analysis (Patterson, 1999).
The accuracy o f the model is determined by how well it classifies companies as 
failed or not failed. A classification matrix, which shows the number and percentage o f 
firms that are classified appropriately is the measurement device used in discriminant 
analysis. The model w ill be tested using both the data fi'om the casinos that are used to 
develop the model and a sample o f firms that are not used in the model development. A 
classification matrix w ill be used to determine the accuracy o f the model and this w ill be 
compared to the prediction accuracy o f classic bankruptcy models applied to casino data 
and to the a priori probabilities o f the data.
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CHAPTER 4
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND RESULTS
This chapter presents the tests that were conducted to select the predictor 
variables that would be used in the discriminant model and the results o f those tests. It 
then shows the results o f the development o f the discriminant model and the tests that 
were used to measure the reliability and significance o f the model.
Selection o f Predictor Variables
Before beginning the discriminant analysis procedure, the data provided by the 
Gaming Control Board was examined to understand and evaluate each ratio provided. 
The data consisted o f the requested ratios as well as some additional information that had 
not been requested. The additional information included several ratios based on hotel 
occupancy, gaming revenues per square foot, bad debt expense as a percent o f revenues, 
complimentary expenses to revenues, gaming revenues to total revenues, current ratios 
and a ratio o f fixed assets to total assets. Each o f these ratios was tested in the 
discriminant model, but none o f them added to the model’s classification accuracy.
Five o f the ratios used in the theoretical model were not used in the analysis; 
quality o f location, quality o f the property, long-term debt to equity, capital spending to 
assets and maintenance costs to assets. The two subjective variables, quality o f location
82
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and quality o f the property, were eliminated because o f the lack o f any definitive 
description o f the methodology used to determine the ratings and the resulting inability to 
replicate a similar index for casinos not included in the data set. The capital spending to 
assets and maintenance cost to assets ratios were not used because it was determined by 
the Gaming Board that the information in their database did not permit them to accurately 
measure the level o f deferred maintenance or the amount spent on maintaining an 
updated facility.
The reason for not using the debt to equity ratio is three-fold. First, the reported 
debt numbers were not reliable in many cases. For example, casinos that were part o f a 
group o f casinos often did not report any debt, since it was all carried on the books o f the 
parent organization. Another problem has to do with the levels o f debt that casinos have 
been able to obtain relative to their equity investment. Many casinos in recent years have 
been financed with debt offerings that either had equity conversion features or appealed 
to a market desire to invest in the casino business. There is also another factor that is 
d ifficult to measure in a traditional financial statement; this factor could be described as 
“ off-balance sheet”  equity. This phenomenon o f closely held businesses occurs when the 
owner guarantees the debt o f the business, thus providing (fi-om the lender’s point-of- 
view) an im plicit level o f equity to secure the debt. Finally, the negative retained 
earnings that can result from acciunulated losses can partially or totally obscure the 
contributed capital o f the company. Although they were not used in the analysis, all the 
variables were tested in the discriminant model and none were found to add to the 
classification accuracy o f the model.
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The data provided by the Gaming Control Board was for two one-year periods, 
one year and two years prior to the bankruptcy filing o f the failed firm  (same time period 
for the non-failed firm  chosen to correspond to each o f the failed firms). The data for one 
year prior to failure plus the percentage change fi'om two years prior to one year prior.
The final coimt o f ratios that were used in the analysis was eight from each year 
and the percentage change in each o f the eight ratios. The eight ratios were: operating 
margin, payroll to sales, payroll to assets, marketing costs to sales, sales to assets, cash 
flow to liabilities, net income to assets and cash to liabilities. Before running the 
discriminant analysis, the data to be used was screened to assiu-e the data met the 
assiunptions o f discriminant analysis.
Assumptions o f Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis has several requirements for its proper application. The key 
assumptions for discriminant analysis are multivariate normality o f the independent 
variables and unknown (but equal) variance-covariance matrices for each o f the groups. 
Despite the fact that according to Hair, Anderson, Tathum and Black (1998), “ Mixed 
evidence exists concerning the sensitivity o f discriminant analysis to violations o f these 
assumptions”  (p. 259), tests were conducted to determine the multivariate normality o f 
the data, and the equality o f the variance-covariance matrices o f the two groups.
In order to test for multivariate normality, all linear combinations o f sampling 
distributions o f means o f predictors would have to be tested for normality. There is 
currently no statistical test for accomplishing this (Hair et al., 1998; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). Since discriminant analysis is fairly robust to failures o f normality, as long
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as the failure o f normality is due to skewness and not outliers, a test was made for 
univariate normality for each o f the predictor variables. Once univariate normality is 
achieved, multivariate normality w ill be assumed, for purposes o f this analysis.
Although univariate normality o f the individual predictor variables does not 
assure multivariate normality, lack o f univariate normality might indicate a lack o f 
multivariate normality. To test for univariate normality, each predictor variable was 
tested individually using the using the Kolmogorov-Smimov test for normality. The 
results o f each o f the tests are shown in Appendix A. Using a significance level o f 5%, 
eighteen o f the thirty-two variables did not pass the normality test.
Examination o f the graphs from the tests seems to indicate that the cause o f the 
failure is primarily the presence o f outliers. One acceptable method o f reducing the 
impact o f univariate outliers is to change the score o f the variable for the outlying case so 
that it is not as deviant. A way to accomplish this is to assign the outlier the value o f the 
next most extreme variable (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). After making this adjustment, 
the Kolmogorov-Smimov tests were rerun for the variables that did not pass. Only four 
o f the variables did not show significant tests for univariate normality after the 
adjustment: % Change in Cash Flow/Liabilities Ratio for failed casinos, Cash/Liabilities 
for non-failed casinos and % Change in Net Income/Total Assets Ratios for both failed 
and non-failed casinos. The three predictor variables associated with these variables 
were eliminated from the analysis.
Having established univariate normality for each o f the predictor variables, tests 
were conducted to determine the homogeneity o f the variance-covariance matrices o f the 
remaining variables o f the two groups. The first procedure is an examination o f within-
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group distributions o f each variable individually by studying boxpiots. The boxplots o f 
each pair o f data are presented in Appendix B. The plots show that some o f the variables 
exhibit within-group distributions that are markedly different between the two groups, but 
overall the distributions are fairly close. Levene tests for equality o f variance were also 
performed on each set o f predictor variables. The Levene tests indicated that for four o f 
the variables, the within-group variances were not equal. Since the tests for inequality 
were not extreme however, none o f the variables was eliminated at this stage o f the 
analysis.
To examine how the variables covary, a scatterplot matrix for each variable was 
created. In the scatterplots, the appearance o f a similarity between the dispersions o f 
variables between the two groups is desired. The scatterplots are presented in Appendix 
C. In general, the dispersions appear similar and homogeneity o f covariance is assumed.
Other statistical tests o f the equality o f covariance matrices were conducted for 
the entire combination o f variables for each group. To conduct the tests, a multivariate 
analysis o f variance technique was used. The tests for equality o f covariance matrices 
used were: Box’s M, P illa i’s True, W ilk s Lambda, Hotelling’s True and Roy’s Largest 
Root. The null hypothesis for each o f the tests is that the observed vector o f means for 
the dependent variables is equal across groups. A ll tests failed to reject the null 
hypothesis at a p-value o f less than .0005. Based on the scatterplots and the statistical 
tests, equality o f the variance-covariance matrices seems reasonable.
The other requirements o f discriminant analysis are: adequate sample sizes, 
linearity o f the predictor variables, lack o f multicollinearity or singularity (Tabachnick &  
Fidell, 1996). Since the two samples have an equal number o f cases, adjustments to
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probability o f group assignment are not necessary in this analysis. There are also no 
missing data in this analysis. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), the sample size 
o f the smallest group should exceed the number o f predictor variables. Using the reduced 
number o f predictor variables, there are thirteen to be used in the analysis. Since there 
are sixteen cases, there should be no problem with overfitting, which is the producing o f 
results so close to the sample that they do not generalize to other samples (Tabachnick &  
Fidell, 1996). Multicollinearity and singularity occur when there are predictor variables 
that are redundant (Hair, Anderson, Tatham &  Black, 1998). This situation was avoided 
both by the definitions o f the variables and by the exclusion o f variables that test for low 
tolerance within the differentiation program itself (Tabachnick &  Fidell, 1996). 
Examination o f the correlation matrix confirmed that the variables did not indicate 
multicollinearity, none o f the correlations exceeded 0.90 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black, 1998).
Having satisfied all the assumptions for using discriminant analysis, the final 
selection o f predictor variables was used in the SPSS Version 10 statistical package’s 
discriminate analysis program.
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Development o f the Discriminant Model
There are two ways o f performing discriminant analysis, stepwise estimation and 
simultaneous estimation (Tabachnick &  Fidell, 1996). The stepwise estimation process 
involves introducing the predictor variables one at a time into the discriminant function, 
based on their discriminating power. The program first selects the variable with the best 
discriminating power, and then adds additional variables one at a time based on their 
ability to improve the discriminant function. The simultaneous estimation procedure 
introduces all o f the predictor variables into the model concurrently. For this study, only 
the simultaneous method was used. The reason for selecting this method is that SPSS 
excludes a variable i f  it contributes the same improvement as another variable, without 
regard for its contribution to the overall classification accuracy. Stepwise estimation is 
also not as accurate with smaller samples (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996).
The results o f discriminate analysis are measured by the degree o f accuracy with 
which the model predicts classification into the proper category (Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
&  Black, 1998). The results o f the casino discrimination model produced a classification 
accuracy o f 100%. A ll failed casinos were predicted to be in the failed group and all non­
failed casinos were predicted to be in the non-failed group.
Strictly as a comparison, the discriminant analysis function was applied to several 
other combinations o f predictor variables. The classification accuracy o f the models for 
combinations o f alternative predictor variables ranged from a low o f 59.4% to a high o f 
93.8%, as variables were removed from the original model to the final one.
The final discriminant model is shown in Model 7 and a graphical view o f the 
discriminant test results is shown in Figure 7. The cutoff score is determined by
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averaging the centroid values o f the two groups. The mean o f the failed group scores is -  
2.09 and the mean o f the non-failed group scores is 2.09, therefore the cutoff score is 0, 
which can be seen in Figure 7.
One variable. Cash Flow/Liabilities had a coefficient o f zero in the model, and is 
left out o f the equation.
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Model 7
Casino bankruptcy prediction model
Prediction Score = .256X, - .178X2 + .365X3 + .223X4 + .603X5 - 949X6 - .025X? +
.923X8 - 26.885Xq + .023Xio - 6.328X,, + 24.454X,z -  24.393
Where:
Xi = Marketing Costs/Total Revenues
X i = Net Income/Total Assets
X] = Total Revenues/Total Assets
X4 = Operating Margin
X 5 = Payroll Costs/Total Revenues
Xb = Payroll Costs/Total Assets
X7 = % Change in Marketing Costs/Total Revenues Ratio
Xg = % Change in Cash Balance/Total Liabilities Ratio
Xq = % Change in Total Revenues/Total Assets Ratio
Xio = % Change in Operating Margin Ratio
X || = % Change in Payroll Costs/Total Revenues Ratio
X 12 = % Change in Payroll Costs/Total Assets Ratio
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Figure 7
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Assessing the Statistical Significance o f the Model
The statistical significance o f the model was evaluated using the W ilks’ Lambda 
statistic, which measures the statistical significance o f the discriminatory power o f the 
model. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), “W ilks’ Lambda is the criterion o f 
choice unless there is reason to use Pillai s criterion”  (p. 401). W ilks’ Lambda expresses 
the proportion o f unexplained variance, it is the ratio o f the within group variance to the 
total variance o f a matrix. The values range from 0 to 1.0, with small values indicating 
strong group differences and values close to one indicating no differences. For the casino 
bankruptcy prediction model, the W ilks’ Lambda was .176, which with 13 degrees o f 
freedom has a significance level o f less than .0005.
The canonical correlation value o f the model is .908, which measures the 
association between the discriminant scores and the groups. For discriminant analysis 
w ith two groups, the canonical correlation is equivalent to the Pearson correlation, which 
measures standardized covariance.
Statistically, the model is strong and its classification accuracy is excellent. To 
test the model’s effectiveness, a test was made using data provided by the Gaming 
Control Board that were not included in the design o f the model.
Test o f the Model
To test the external validity o f the model, data not used in the development o f the 
model are tested using the discriminant model (Hair, Anderson, Tathan &  Black, 1998). 
External validity relates to how well the model works for predicting failure for firms that
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were not included in the original analysis. To test the internal validity o f the model, the 
data used in the development o f the model are used.
Two sources o f data were examined to determine i f  the data necessary to run the 
model might be available for casinos that were not located in Nevada. The Research 
Insights database o f all SEC reports was examined, as well as the monthly and annual 
reports o f the New Jersey Casino Control Commission. While much o f the data was 
found in these sources, there was no information on two o f the variables in either source; 
advertising and promotion costs and payroll costs.
The Nevada Gaming Control Board data that was used to develop the model 
included all the bankrupt casinos in their database. There were no failed casinos that 
were not included in the study for which the required information was available to test 
the model. Information on non-failed casinos that were not included was available from 
the Nevada Gaming Control Board.
An alternative test was produced. A decision was made to use financial 
information for failed casinos that were used in the model development, but from 
different years. While this test is not as conclusive as one using different casinos, it was 
felt that it would give an indication using new data. The non-failed casinos would be 
ones that were not used in the model development. The test period would be two years 
prior to failure.
After obtaining the new information, the data were entered into an Excel 
worksheet to calculate the discriminant scores for the casinos in the test sample. Using 
the cutoff score o f zero, the model correctly classified 100% o f the failed firms and 89% 
o f the non-failed firms, for an overall classification accuracy o f 92.3%.
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CHAPTER 5
C O N C LU S IO N S  A N D  S U M M A R Y
The purpose o f this study was to develop a bankruptcy prediction model for the 
casino industry that would incorporate financial relationships that are significant to the 
casino business that might not be significant in other types o f businesses. The study 
began by reviewing the history and evolution o f financial analysis in America. Classic 
bankruptcy prediction studies were each examined to understand the methodologies and 
procedures that had been used by other researchers. A review o f a prior study (Patterson, 
1999) showed that the classic bankruptcy prediction models that are currently being used 
in the casino industry do not accurately predict failure or non-failure for casinos.
Next, a group o f experts were interviewed in order to collect and understand 
information and opinions they had concerning bankruptcy in the casino business. Using 
the information collected through these interviews, a theoretical model o f the factors that 
contribute to success or failure in the casino business was designed. The theoretical 
constructs o f this model are; Management, Location, Ambiance, Marketing and Financial 
Strength.
For each construct a measurement indicator was defined and the type o f empirical 
data that would be used for the measurement was identified. For the management 
construct, the measurement indicators selected were: cost control, as measured by the
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operating margin ratio; staff costs, as measured by the ratio o f payroll costs to sales; and 
staffing levels, as measured by the ratio o f payroll costs to assets. Location was 
measured by a subjective rating o f the property, taking into account such things as 
accessibility, proximity to competition, proximity to target market and esthetic quality o f 
surroundings. Ambiance relates to how the property is maintained and how comfortable 
and satisfied with the appearance o f the property the patrons are. The ambiance o f the 
property was measured by how updated the property was kept, as shown by the capital 
spending to assets ratio. Another consideration in assessing ambiance is the level o f 
deferred maintenance as indicated by the ratio o f maintenance costs to assets. Finally a 
subjective evaluation o f the overall quality o f the property was made.
Marketing was evaluated only in financial terms, as a comparison to the levels o f 
marketing or the failed and non-failed firms. Another important factor in marketing is 
the effectiveness o f the marketing effort, but direct measurement o f this attribute did not 
lend itself to this study. The two measures o f the marketing construct chosen for this 
model were marketing effort and marketing efficiency. Marketing effort relates to the 
relative amount o f money spent on marketing to the size o f the property, the ratio o f 
marketing costs to sales was used to measure this factor. Marketing efficiency is the 
amount o f sales that is generated relative to the size o f the property, and is measured by 
the ratio o f sales to assets.
Financial strength was measured using the four classic aspects o f a firm ’s 
financial position: leverage, solvency, return and liquidity. The amount o f debt a firm  
has relative to its overall capitalization (leverage) is shown by the ratio o f debt to equity. 
A firm ’s ability to pay its obligations as they become due (solvency) is measured by the
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ratio o f cash flow to liabilities. The level o f return generated relative to the size o f the 
investment in the firm  is measured by the ratio o f net income to assets. Liquidity relates 
to the firm ’s ability to pay its current obligations, and is measured by the ratio o f cash to 
liabilities.
Having developed a theoretical model o f the constructs that indicate success or 
failure in the casino business, a statistical technique for establishing a model that would 
accurately classify a firm as failing or not failing was selected. The approach chosen for 
this study was discriminant analysis, using the SPSS statistical analysis package, version 
10.0. This approach was picked over the other techniques primarily because it is the 
method that has been used in the majority o f the classic bankruptcy prediction studies that 
were reviewed for this study. Discriminant analysis also has the advantage o f producing 
a result that is easier to understand by non-statisticians than some o f the other 
approaches, such as logistic analysis. Discriminant analysis is also considered more 
appropriate for smaller samples and its accuracy at classification is often superior to the 
other methods that could be used.
The data used in the study was obtained from the Nevada Gaming Control Board. 
They provided the requested ratios for each o f the bankrupt casinos in their database, 
which included all casinos with gross revenues in excess o f $1 million. The database has 
information on casinos fiom 1985 to 2000. They also provided the same types o f 
information for an equal number o f non-bankrupt casinos that were considered 
comparable properties. For each casino, two years o f data were provided for each ratio.
Before beginning the analysis o f the data, the entire set o f data was reviewed with 
the auditor from the Gaming Control Board who had prepared it. From the original set o f
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thirteen ratios requested, it was determined that the information reported by the casinos 
that was used in the computation o f three o f the ratios was not suitable for inclusion in 
the study. It was also determined that the qualitative evaluations o f location and property 
quality were too subjective and that they would not be appropriate for inclusion in the 
study.
To avoid the problem o f having separate models for each o f the two years o f data 
provided, after reviewing the data, the % change in the ratios from one year to the next 
was included as a variable in the analysis. It was felt that the deterioration o f a ratio 
could be as predictive as the ratio itself. The inclusion o f these percentage change ratios 
resulted in a total o f sixteen ratios for the analysis.
Results o f Tests
Before performing a discriminant analysis, the data to be used in the analysis must 
be examined to assure that the requirements for the proper application o f discriminant 
analysis are met. Key assumptions include multivariate normality o f the independent 
variables, homogeneity o f variance covariance matrices for each group, the absence o f 
significant outliers, absence o f missing data, sufficient sample size, mutually exclusive 
and fu lly exhaustive group definitions, lack o f multicollinearity or singularity.
Plots o f each o f the variables and pairs o f variables were studied and statistical 
tests were performed to determine that the assumptions necessary for discriminant 
analysis were satisfied. As a result o f these tests, three o f the ratios were eliminated fi-om 
the data set to be analyzed, leaving thirteen ratios in the final analysis.
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The results o f the discriminant analysis produced a model that used twelve o f the 
variables and produced a classification accuracy o f 100%. The model was found to be 
statistically significant. W ilks’ Lambda was used to measure the significance o f the 
discriminatory power o f the model (.176, p<.0005). Canonical correlation, which 
measures the strength o f the association between the discriminant scores and the groups, 
had a value o f .908, indicating a strong association.
The model was also tested using data that were not included in the development 
o f the model. The model accurately classified 100% o f the failed casinos and 89% o f the 
non-failed casinos, for an overall classification accuracy o f 92.3%, for this test data. A 
Classification Matrix showing the results o f the test is presented in Table 3.
Table 3





Failed 100% 0 100%
Non-Failed 11% 89% 100%
Total 38.5% 61.5% 92.3%
Since the identity o f the casinos in the test group were not known, it was not 
possible to gather the additional financial information for the test group that was 
necessary to test the Altman, Deakin and Zavgren models using the same casinos. 
However, since the original tests on the Altman, Deakin and Zavgren models included all 
the bankrupt Nevada casinos for the test period (Patterson, 1999), the results o f those
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tests were used to compare their accuracy to the accuracy o f the new casino bankruptcy 
prediction model. The ratios that were used for the test o f the casino prediction model 
were from financial reports filed two years prior to bankruptcy (for the failed firms). The 
results o f the tests in the Patterson 1999 study were performed both one year prior to 
failure and two years prior to failure, for this comparison only the results o f the tests two 
years prior to failure were used. The overall classification results o f each o f the models 
are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
Comparison o f Classification Accuracy
100
Naïve Prediction 50%
Altman Z Score Model 58%
Deakin Linear Model 75%
Deakin Quadratic Model 42%
Deakin Combined Model 33%
Zavgren Model 29%
Casino Prediction Model 92.3%
Tests o f Null Hypotheses and Conclusions
Null Hypothesis One, that a statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed 
using casino data w ill not predict bankruptcy more accurately than a naïve prediction, is 
rejected. The casino prediction model showed a classification accuracy rate o f 100% and 
92.3% for the holdout sample. A  random selection process based on a priori probabilities 
would be expected to have a classification accuracy rate o f 50% with equal sized groups.
Null Hypothesis Two, that a statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed 
using casino data w ill not predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Altman Z Score 
model (1966), is rejected. The Altman Z-score model using casino data showed a 
classification accuracy rate o f 58% two years prior to failure, in a prior study (Patterson, 
1999).
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Null Hypothesis Three, that a statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed 
using casino data w ill not predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Deakin models 
(1972). is rejected. The Deakin linear model using casino data showed a classification 
accuracy rate o f 75% two years prior to failure, in a prior study (Patterson, 1999). The 
Deakin quadratic model showed a classification accuracy o f 42% two years prior to 
failure. The Deakin combined models showed a classification accuracy rate o f 33% two 
years prior to failure (Patterson, 1999).
Null Hypothesis Four, that a statistical bankruptcy prediction model developed 
using casino data w ill not predict bankruptcy more accurately than the Zavgren model 
(1985), is rejected. The Zavgren model using casino data showed a classification 
accuracy rate o f 29% two years prior to failure (Patterson, 1999).
Based on the data available for analysis, the conclusion is that the study was able 
to develop a statistically significant model for predicting bankruptcy in the casino 
industry.
Areas for Future Research 
This study indicates that the financial characteristics o f the casino industry are 
sufficiently different firom other industries that financial analysis techniques specifically 
designed to address these differences are necessary. Utilizing techniques and standards 
that were developed for other industries may yield misleading indications o f the financial 
health o f a casino. Through the development o f standards and methods o f measurement 
that are appropriate for casinos, it is possible that the performance and future o f 
individual casinos and the industry can be improved.
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As Altman observed in his classic study, the ideal would be to construct 
individual models for specific industries. This study has shown that the results o f looking 
at casino ratios does in fact make a significant difference in the accuracy o f the 
classification o f casinos into failed and non-failed groups. Similar analysis o f other 
industries, such as the hotel industry and the food and beverage industry would likely 
result in more accurate models.
Building on the research done for this study, the results should be studied to 
determine i f  it is possible to develop a way to use the casino prediction score as a 
measure o f the overall financial health o f a casino. I f  it can be shown that the casino 
prediction score can be used as an index o f a casino’s financial health, and that the 
magnitude o f the score is meaningful, it could become a standard for the industry.
A different approach to measuring the constructs that were excluded from the 
model needs to be developed. While it would not be possible to improve the 
classification accuracy o f the model, the inclusion o f these variables (at least intuitively) 
could make it a much more powerful tool.
Additional data needs to be analyzed. Other jurisdictions require casinos to report 
financial information. It is possible that the information needed to replicate this study 
could be obtained, based on the results o f this study and the approach to the format o f the 
data that was approved by the Nevada Gaming Control Board.
Other statistical techniques should be tested. Some o f the assumptions for 
discriminant analysis are hard to explicitly describe and some other method might 
produce results that are more statistically sound.
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The benefits o f having financial tools that are designed for the casino industry 
must be communicated to the industry leaders who control access to the information 
necessary to develop those tools. Uniform accounting and reporting standards need to be 
developed for the industry that incorporate an adequate level o f detail and consistency for 
meaningful analysis. Governmental organizations that mandate the use o f these standards 
need to understand exactly what is needed, and they must demand that the data provided 
be accurate and complete. Financial reporting in the casino business today looks a lot 
like the reporting that was done in the transportation and industrial sectors in the 
nineteenth century.
Summary
The model developed in this study was able to predict failure or non-failure o f 
casinos with 92.3% accuracy. This classification accuracy rate is significantly better than 
the classification accuracy rate achieved by conventional bankruptcy prediction models 
that were developed for industrial companies. The study indicates that there is a need to 
develop similar indicators o f financial health for other sectors o f the hospitality industry 
using more specific measurements o f the drivers o f success that are peculiar to those 
sectors.
The model developed can enhance the ability o f investors to quantitatively assess 
their casino investments and potential investments. Regulators and auditors should use 
the model to determine the scope o f financial reviews. It should become a part o f the 
"going-concem" assessment process. Lenders should use the model when considering 
new loans, loan extensions or requests for renegotiation o f loan terms. It can provide
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management with information that could indicate necessary changes in operating policies 
and cost controls. It should be used as a budgeting and long-term planning tool to assess 
the impact o f proposed changes and planning assumptions.
The study provided an example o f why more consistency in reporting financial 
results is essential to the ability to develop analytical tools that can enhance the future o f 
the business. Billions o f dollars are now invested in the casino business, and it is still 
considered a high-risk investment by many. Through an enhanced understanding o f the 
business through new ways o f analyzing the business, it may be possible to improve this 
high-risk perception.
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Kolmogorov-Srrtmov Itrmalily Test 
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Figure A2
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Figure A3
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Kokmgorov-Snifnov Normality Test 
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Figure A4
















Kolmogorov-Smmov Normality Test 
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Figure A5
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Figure A6
Test for normality -  Operating Margin for failed casinos

















Kolmogorov-Smimov Normality Test 
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Figure A7
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Figure A8
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Figure A9
Test for normality — % Change in A&P/Total Revenues Ratio for failed casinos
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Figure AlO
Test for normality — % Change in Cash Flow/Liabilities Ratio for failed casinos

















Kolimgorov-Smmov Normality Test 
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Figure Al 1
Test for normality -  % Change in Cash/Liabilities Ratio for failed casinos
















Kolmogorov-Srrimov Normality Test 
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Figure A12
Test for normality -  % Change in Net Income/Assets Ratio for failed casinos















Kolmogorov-Sirimov Normality Test 
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Figure A l3
Test for normality -  % Change in Sales/Assets Ratio for failed casinos
















Kolmogorov-Smmov Norrality Test 
0*: 0.506 D-: 0.379 0  : 0.506 
Appro»mate P> Value < 0.01
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119
Figure A14
Test for normality -  % Change in Operating Margin Ratio for failed casinos
















Kolmogorov-Smmov hbrmality Test 
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Figure A l5
Test for normality — % Change in Payroll/Revenues Ratio for failed casinos
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Figure A16
Test for normality -  % Change in Payroll/Assets Ratio for failed casinos















Kolmogorov-Srrimov htormality Test 
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Figure Al 7
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Figure Al 8
Test for normality -  Cash Flow/Liabilities for non-failed casinos

















Kolnngorov^rnmov Normality Test 
D*: 0.214 t>: 0.202 0:0.214 
ApprowTBte P-Value: 0.049
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
Figure A19

















Kolmogorov>Sirimov Nonrelity Test 
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Figure A20
Test for normality -  Net Income/Assets for non-failed casinos
















Kolnogorov-Srirnov Narnelily Test 
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Figure A21
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Figure A22


















Kolmogorov-Smmov Normality Test 
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Figure A23

















Kolmogorov-Smmov Normality Test 
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Figure A24
















Kolmogorov-Sfiwnov Normality Test 
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Figure A25
Test for normality -  % Change in A&P/Total Revenue Ratio for non-failed casinos

















Kolmogorov-Sinmov Nsmality Test 
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Figure A26
Test for normality — % Change in Cash Flow/Liabilities Ratio for non-failed casinos

















Kolmogorov-Smimov Normality Test 
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Figure A27
Test for normality — % Change in Cash/Liabilities Ratio for non-failed casinos
















Kblmogorov-Snimov Mirmality Test 
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Figure A28
Test for normality — % Change in Net Income/Assets Ratio for non-failed casinos















Kolmogorov-SrrimQv Normality Test 
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Figure A29
Test for normality — % Change in Sales/Assets Ratio for non-failed casinos

















Kolmogorov-Srnmov Ptrmalily Test 
D*: 0.117 D-: 0.111 D: 0.117 
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Figure A30
Test for normality -  % Change in Operating Margin Ratio for non-failed casinos
















Kolmogorov-Smimov Normality Test 
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ApproMirate P-Value < 0.01
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Figure A31
Test for normality -  % Change in Payroll/Revenues Ratio for non-failed casinos















Kolirngorov-StTimov Nomlity Test 
D*: 0.132 0-: 0.169 0:0.169 
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Figure A32
Test for normality — % Change in Payroll/Assets Ratio for non-failed casinos

















Kolmogorov-Smirnov Normality Test 
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Figure B1
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Figure B2
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Figure B3
Within-Group Distribution -  Net Income/Assets
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Figure B4
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Figure B5
Within-Group Distribution -  Operating Margin
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Figure B6
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Figure B7
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Figure B8
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Figure B9
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Figure BIO 
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Figure BU
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Figure B12
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Figure B13
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Figure C2
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Figure C3
Scatterplot of Net Income/Assets
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Figure C5
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Figure C8
Scatterplot of % Change in A&P/Total Revenues Ratio
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Figure C9
Scatterplot of % Change in Cash/Liabilities Ratio
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Figure CIO
Scatterplot of % Change in Sales/Assets Ratio
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Figure C il
Scatterplot of % Change in Operating Margin
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Figure C12
Scatterplot of % Change in Payroll/Revenue Ratio
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Figure C l3
Scatterplot of % Change in Payroll/Assets Ratio
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